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ABSTRACT
While agency problems inevitably exist in buyer-supplier relationships, the focus
on how to overcome such problems has been confined to the buyer-supplier dyad as
if the dyad exists in isolation. In this dissertation, I re-frame the agency problems
beyond the dyadic relationship between a buyer and its supplier and suggest a new
way to overcome agency problems. While the current Agency Theory suggests that
the buyer can monitor and provide incentives to mitigate the agency problems, I
propose to look beyond the dyad in addressing buyer-supplier agency problems.
In the first chapter, I examine the impact of the “indirect links” in which the buyer
is connected to the supplier through a third actor. I propose a conceptual framework
that specifies how the indirect links can overcome agency problems through the effects
of information exchange, mutual monitoring, power change, and network governance.
These different effects are enabled by the indirect links based on the different network
positions and levels of connectivity of the third actor. The first chapter provides a
theoretical framework for Chapter 2 and 3.
In Chapter 2, the effect of network governance enabled by the indirect links is
investigated. In particular, two scenario-based role-play experiments were conducted
with managers to examine the effects of dyadic and network governance mechanisms
on supplier opportunism. In Study 1, the participants took the perspective of a
supplier, while in Study 2, the participants took the role of a buyer. The results show
that network governance mechanism reduces the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral
intentions directly and indirectly through the negative affection prediction, and while
suppliers may overlook the buyer’s reactions as they make decisions, the buyers are
likely to react against the supplier, such as engage in negative word-of-mouth or
reduce level of commitment.
Finally, directed sourcing, a direct application of how a buyer could overcome
i
agency problems beyond the dyad, is examined in Chapter 3. Directed sourcing is
an emerging sourcing practice in which the buying firms bypass the top-tier suppliers
and directly manage or contract with lower-tier suppliers, and research on this new
practice is in its infancy. Therefore, multi-tier multi-task principal-agent models are
developed to investigate the effect of directed sourcing practice on each member in
this three-tier supply chain, comparing with traditional tiered sourcing. The results
show that directed sourcing generally benefits the original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) and the lower-tier supplier, while it harms the top-tier supplier. Yet, directed
sourcing is not always beneficial to the OEM. Therefore, an OEM should be selective
in implementing this new strategy.
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Chapter 1
BEYOND THE DYAD: ADDRESSING AGENCY PROBLEMS THROUGH
INDIRECT LINKS
Abstract
Conflicts are an inevitable part of buyer-supplier relationships. To overcome con-
flict, such as goal incongruence and information asymmetry, agency theory suggests
that the buyer should devise ways to monitor supplier behavior and to incentivize
the supplier through contractual terms. A critical departure from the current state
of the literature occurs from an observation that these strategies are confined to the
dyadic context. When we expand our perspective beyond the buyer-supplier dyad,
we see indirect links that connect the buyer and supplier through other interorgani-
zational actors. In particular, we consider the indirect links that occur through the
supplier’s supplier, the buyer’s other supplier, the supplier’s other customer, and the
buyer’s customer. We propose that these different indirect links could enable the
effects of information exchange, mutual monitoring, power, and network governance
and, thus, change the dynamics in the buyer-supplier dyad. We propose that the use
of indirect, interorganizational links offers a new perspective to address agency prob-
lems, complementary to monitoring and incentivizing. This paper extends agency
theory beyond the dyadic context, and suggests that managers should look outside
the buyer-supplier dyad for opportunities to resolve relational conflict.
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1.1 Introduction
Conflicts between a buying firm and its suppliers are unavoidable. Such conflicts
can be counterproductive and often require considerable corporate resources. They
are prevalent in adversarial or transactional relationships (Ellram and Carr, 1994;
Burnes and New, 1997; Ellram, 1991), but can exist also in collaborative relation-
ships (Rossetti and Choi, 2005; Krause and Ellram, 2014; Jia and Zsidisin, 2014;
Richey et al., 2010), including relationships with high levels of trust and commit-
ment (Read et al., 2014; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Ellinger et al., 2006; Mohr and
Spekman, 1994).
For example, LGE had difficulties working with Qualcomm, its CDMA-chip sup-
plier. Despite their long-term relationship, the two companies were constantly jock-
eying for leverage (Choi and Linton, 2011). LGE reasoned it was the principal, and
was spending about $1 Billion annually on this supplier, while Qualcomm countered
by reminding LGE that it owned the intellectual property on CDMA technology. Ac-
cording to agency theory, such conflicts in a buyer-supplier relationship are due to
goal incongruence and information asymmetry and can be mitigated through mecha-
nisms such as monitoring by the buyer and providing incentives to the supplier. LGE
worked hard to solve this issue by adding incentive terms and by building a close rela-
tionship with Qualcomm. Yet, the problem persisted. Similar conflict exists in most
buyer-supplier relationships. For example, a supplier may not act as responsively to
the buyer’s requests as it should, or it may intentionally slow down the transfer of
information to the buyer even in a long-term relationship. According to Kim and
Choi (2015), Apple and Boeing are “seeing signs of deterioration in some of their
long-standing relationships with cooperative suppliers” (Kim and Choi, 2015).
One possible reason why conflict persists, even though agency theory suggests
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that it should be minimized through monitoring and incentives, is that the effort
that the buyer has been making focuses solely on the relationship itself. In other
words, the buyer rarely goes beyond the buyer-supplier dyad when it is trying to
resolve issues with the supplier. Interestingly, once LGE moved beyond the dyad by
forging an informal relationship with TSMC, its second-tier supplier that manufac-
tures the CDMA-chips for Qualcomm, it discovered that Qualcomm became more
accommodating. This example illustrates how the current literature and practices
in buyer-supplier relationships, confined in the dyad, may benefit from considering
external ties within which the dyad is embedded.
From the perspective of agency theory, the buyer, as the principal, inevitably faces
agency problems with its supplier, the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Harris
and Raviv, 1978). Such buyer-supplier relationships have been analyzed through
agency theory (Rossetti and Choi, 2008; Balakrishnan et al., 2008; Lado et al., 2008;
Weigelt and Sarkar, 2009; Frankel et al., 2008; Fugate et al., 2006; Rungtusanatham
et al., 2007). However, there have been calls to consider buyer-supplier relationships
beyond the dyadic context (Worsham et al., 1997; Choi and Kim, 2008). More specif-
ically, there is an opportunity to consider the buyer-supplier relationship as having
extended ties within a broader interorganizational network.
As a next logical step to investigate the role of extended ties in addressing the
agency problem between the buyer and the supplier, we consider one neighboring
node and indirect links that pass through this node. In the buyer-supplier context,
a neighboring node can be the supplier’s supplier, the supplier’s other customer, the
buyer’s other supplier, or the buyer’s customer. And the term indirect links is defined
as the links between two actors through other actors in the common network.
Such indirect links outside the buyer-supplier dyad are complimentary to monitor-
ing and incentivizing as suggested by the current perspective of agency theory (Eisen-
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hardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005). In the following sections, we first offer an overview of
relevant concepts and principles in agency theory and briefly review how agency the-
ory has been applied in the buyer-supplier relationship literature. To develop our
theoretical framework and propositions, we first define indirect links and then ex-
plain how buying firms can address agency problems by managing the indirect links.
We focus on the effects of information, mutual monitoring, power, and network gov-
ernance and discuss how different indirect links could enable these effects. We also
discuss the limitation for using indirect links for agency problems. Lastly, we discuss
implications for researchers and practitioners and offer directions for future research.
1.2 Overview of Agency Problems in the Buyer-Supplier Context
1.2.1 Agency Problems in the Buyer-Supplier Context
At its core, agency theory discusses the problems in a principal-agent relation-
ship (Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The principal engages the agent to
perform a task “which involves delegating some decision making authority to the
agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.308). The goal of the principal is to have the
agent perform the task as if the principal itself were doing so (Eisenhardt, 1989).
However, “if both parties . . . are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe
that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal” (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976) (p.308). The deviation between the agent’s actual behaviors and the
behaviors in the interests of the principal is called the “agency problem” (Eisenhardt,
1989; Shapiro, 2005).
The agency problem arises when “the desires or goals of the principal and agent
conflict” (goal incongruence) and when “it is difficult or expensive for the principal to
verify what the agent is actually doing” (information asymmetry) (Eisenhardt, 1989,
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p.58). Goal incongruence has been associated with goal misalignment, goal conflict,
and goal incompatibilities in the literature (Das and Rahman, 2010; Handley and
Benton Jr., 2009; Rossetti and Choi, 2008). For example, considering a manufacturer-
distributor relationship (Lassar and Kerr, 1996), the distributor may pursue its own
goals of maximizing sales of all the products which it carries, in ways that conflict
with the manufacturer’s broader interests of maximizing sales of its own products. In
the supply chain literature, buyers and suppliers typically experience misalignment
in their financial and operational goals (Rossetti and Choi, 2008).
Besides goal incongruence, information asymmetry is another key contributor to
the agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). The agent’s actual behaviors are often
inaccessible to the principal (Hendry, 2002; Jacobides and Croson, 2001); otherwise,
the principal could create a “perfect” contract that compensates the agent based
on the its actual behaviors (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the case of adverse selection,
a downstream distributor may intentionally misrepresent its capabilities to win a
contract (Wallace et al., 2009). Information asymmetry also contributes to agency
problems after the agent is selected. A typical problem is moral hazard – a lack of
effort on the part of the agent Ho¨lmstrom (1979). A supplier could use low quality
material or labor for its own savings, and such behaviors are often unknown to the
buyer at the time of delivery (Rao et al., 1999; Eisenhardt, 1989; Ho¨lmstrom, 1979).
1.2.2 Overcoming Agency Problems in the Buyer-Supplier Context
Agency problems can be overcome by the use of contractual terms that align
“the agent’s preferences with those of the principal” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.61). With
appropriate incentive terms, the discrepancy between the agent’s and the principal’s
objective functions decreases, and the agent is more likely to choose actions that
favor both parties (Ross, 1973). This issue has been well studied in the management
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literature, e.g., the CEO’s actions are better aligned with the shareholders’ goals when
he/she is incentivized with stock options (DeMott, 1997; Tosi et al., 1997; Wageman
and Baker., 1997; Wright et al., 2007).
Similar practices to incentivize suppliers are suggested in the supply chain lit-
erature (Giunipero, 1990). Traditionally, buyers use market-based incentives (e.g.,
increased volumes of present business and priority consideration for future business)
based on the evaluation criteria that align with the buyer’s goals (Monczka et al.,
1993; Giunipero, 1990; Krause et al., 2000). Yet such incentives are usually accompa-
nied by competitive pressure created by the buyer so that the relationship between a
buyer and its supplier is often short-term (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993; Giunipero, 1990).
Since the Japanese manufacturers entered the U.S. in the 1980’s, the quality and
cost gap caused by such a short-term orientation became salient. Supply base reduc-
tion was practiced and long-term oriented relationships were built between buyers
and suppliers (Terpend et al., 2008; Krause, 1999; Krause et al., 2001). Such rela-
tionships incentivize the suppliers through the increasing sense of security in future
contracts so that the suppliers are more committed to the buyer and the goal incon-
gruence is reduced (Choi and Wu, 2009; Kwon and Suh, 2004; Dionisis et al., 2002).
Further, buyers have also employed supplier development programs which improve
supplier performance and increase interdependency (Monczka et al., 1993; Newman
and Rhee, 1990; Krause et al., 2000). Transaction-specific investments also incen-
tivize the suppliers through more secured future contracts and increase the suppliers’
willingness to trust and commit to the buyer (Dyer and Chu, 2011; Krause et al.,
2007; Dionisis et al., 2002; Kwon and Suh, 2004; Williamson, 1981).
Another way to address agency problems is monitoring. Monitoring refers to
“observation of agent efforts or outcomes that is accomplished through supervision,
accounting control, and other devices” ((Tosi et al., 1997, p.588). Since monitor-
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ing informs the principal about what the agent is actually doing, “they are likely to
curb agent opportunism because the agent will realize that he or she cannot deceive
the principal” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.60). For example, the management literature
has demonstrated that managers are more disciplined when they are closely moni-
tored by shareholders directly or indirectly through a third party or efficient capital
and labor markets, or by installing an information system (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Walsh and Seward, 1990; Lane et al., 1998; Fama, 1980;
Fama and Jensen, 1983). Similarly, supply managers have also adopted practices to
overcome information asymmetry occurring in supplier selection and supplier manage-
ment. For example, assessing a supplier for its innovation capabilities and long-term
manufacturing potential would allow the buyer to collect more accurate and updated
information to mitigate the problem of adverse selection (Choi and Hartley, 1996;
Giunipero, 1990; Krause et al., 2000). In addition, some buyers also directly involve
themselves in the supplier development effort and dedicate personnel temporarily to
the supplier (Monczka et al., 1993; Newman and Rhee, 1990; Krause et al., 2000).
The direct involvement allows the buyer to gain more real and detailed information
about the suppliers’ processes and activities, which reduces the potential problem of
shirking. Supplier integration and the adoption of inter-organizational information
systems (e.g., ERP systems) also contribute to the reduction of information asymme-
try in a similar manner (Andersen and Buvik, 2001; Carr and Pearson, 2002; Guan
and Rehme, 2012; Holland et al., 1992; Terpend et al., 2008). Most of these practices
are considered as means to monitor or to improve the efficiency of monitoring.
However, both the incentive and monitoring approaches are confined in the principal-
agent dyad and can be ineffective. While the incentive approach transfers risks to
the agents, who are generally more risk averse (Lane et al., 1998; Tosi et al., 1997;
Waterman and Meier, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989), the effect of monitoring is threatened
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due to measurement imperfection, multiple tasks in agency relations, ex ante causal
ambiguity, and reactance caused by offending the agent’s sense of autonomy (Jaco-
bides and Croson, 2001; Williamson, 1975; Tosi et al., 1997; Sharma, 1997; Baker,
1992; Brehm, 1966; Heide et al., 2007). Therefore, we introduce the concept of indi-
rect links that extend beyond the buyer-supplier dyad to address agency problems in
a broader context.
1.3 Indirect Links and the Effects on Buyer-Supplier Agency Problems
The buyer-supplier dyad is embedded in a broader network of organizations.
Within a network, a node can connect with another node directly or indirectly (Gra-
novetter, 1973). Figure 1.1 illustrates the direct and indirect links involving a dyad
and an additional node. The A-B link represents the direct, buyer (A)-supplier (B)
link, and the A-C and B-C links combined are the indirect links connecting A and
B. Here, A and B are linked directly in a buyer-supplier relationship and indirectly
through a third firm, and we define the indirect links as a set of links that connect
the buyer-supplier dyad through an external node.
Figure 1.1: Direct and Indirect Links Between Node A and B
From a structural perspective, there are four positions that the external nodes
could occupy, relative to the buyer-supplier dyad, to form a triad (Bastl, Johnson, and
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Choi 2013). In the order of a typical material flow, the four positions are: (1) upstream
to the supplier, e.g., the supplier’s supplier; (2) horizontal to the supplier, e.g., the
buyer’s other supplier; (3) horizontal to the buyer, e.g., the supplier’s other customer;
and (4) downstream to the buyer, e.g., the buyer’s customer. These four positions
generally represent all types of business relationships within a supply network 1 .
Table 1.1 demonstrates the four types of indirect links and offers industry examples
in the right-hand column (Caro et al., 2015; Choi and Linton, 2011; Wu and Choi,
2005).
Due to the nature of the business relationships, indirect links that go through a
third node will influence the focal buyer-supplier agency problems in different ways.
Therefore, we propose four effects enabled by the indirect links and discuss in detail
how these effects could address the focal buyer-supplier agency problems.
1.3.1 The Effect of Information Exchange Enabled by Indirect Links
As we look beyond the focal buyer-supplier dyad, we start to see how the buyer
could reduce information asymmetry by connecting to a third node that holds infor-
mation that is unavailable to the buyer. For example, a buyer’s trust in a supplier
can be “granted on the basis of the supplier’s history in relationships with other
firms” (Doney and Cannon, 1997, p.38). A buyer can use the information from other
organizations to verify the supplier’s claims and actions.
The third node can be a supplier’s supplier or its customer, which usually has
first-hand experience with the supplier and holds information that may not be readily
known by the buyer. When connecting the supplier’s supplier, the buyer notices how
this third organization could disclose new information often blocked by its supplier.
1Although other types of links, such as a link with government, a university, or an industry
association, exist and could influence the buyer-supplier dyad, we focus our framework on business
relationships.
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Table 1.1: Identification of Indirect Links
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For example, the supplier’s supplier is likely to know more than the buyer about the
quality and cost of the raw materials. In the LGE example (shown in Table 1.1(a)),
a supplier such as Qualcomm would be concerned that LGE might find out more
about its cost structure through its supplier, TSMC, which is LGE’s second tier
supplier. Further, by connecting to the supplier’s supplier, the buyer is able to collect
information about the supplier’s behavior and performance that cannot be obtained
through direct interaction with the supplier. Although collecting information from
the supplier’s supplier is likely to incur additional costs for the buyer, it provides
new information that can be used to reduce the level of information asymmetry. In
addition, since such information can be readily available to the supplier’s supplier but
not to the buyer, utilizing the indirect links through the supplier’s supplier is likely
to be more cost effective than direct monitoring.
Similarly, the buyer can obtain information about the supplier from the supplier’s
other customers. Directly or indirectly, firms participate in discourse and information
exchange based on their experiences with whom they interact (Basdeo et al., 2006;
Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Choi and Kim (2008) proposed that buying firms
should look beyond the dyad when they select suppliers. In one of their examples,
Automaker 1 could not fully understand its supplier’s behavior (i.e., falling short
of quality requirements) until it began looking into this supplier’s relationship with
one of its other customers, Automaker 2. Had Automaker 1 been monitoring Au-
tomaker 2 and its relationship with this supplier, it could have taken more proactive
measures. Therefore, it can be beneficial for a firm to know who its key supplier’s
other customers are, and how their relationship may affect the interaction between
the supplier and itself. Another example is ACCORD India (shown in Table 1.1(c)),
a chief executive search firm in India. This company provides a platform for buyers
to share their supplier auditing reports regarding corporate social responsibility prac-
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tices. Although buyers publish such reports for their customers and investors, the
same information can benefit other buyers that work with the same supplier (Caro
et al., 2015). Therefore, by connecting to the supplier’s other customer, the buyer
can also obtain information about the supplier at a relatively low cost.
The same idea can be applied to the situation in which the third node is the
supplier’s peer that has first-hand experience with the focal supplier and holds infor-
mation that is valuable but not readily available to the buyer. In general, enabled by
the indirect links through the supplier’s supplier, its customer, or its peer, the buyer
could reduce the level of information asymmetry in the buyer-supplier relationship
by more cost-effectively collecting information from other sources. This leads to our
first proposition:
P1: Indirect links external to the buyer-supplier dyad can be a source of information
for the buyer to reduce the information asymmetry internal to the buyer-supplier
dyad.
1.3.2 The Effect of Mutual Monitoring Enabled by Indirect Links
Beyond the focal buyer-supplier dyad, the buyer interacts with other suppliers.
When the other supplier does not compete directly with the focal supplier, the two
suppliers can be engaged in monitoring each other’s behavior to internally control pro-
cesses as well as to improve performance without the buyer’s intervention (Fama and
Jensen, 1983). In the context of organizational hierarchies, upper level managers can
monitor lower level managers and vice versa (Fama, 1980). The agents are motivated
to monitor each other because their performance depends on, at least partially, the
performance of the other agent, and because the agents perceive that such monitoring
behavior can lead to rewards; for instance, lower level managers can short-circuit the
“shirking or less competent managers above them” (Fama, 1980, p.293). When the
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agents work closely with each other, mutual monitoring serves an important role in
collecting low-cost information to address the agency problem.
We propose, in the supply chain context, that a buyer can create a relational
structure similar to mutual monitoring. The buyer can bring together suppliers to
collaborate on projects (Wu and Choi, 2005). Since the two suppliers are cooperating,
the two suppliers receive first-hand information about each other at a lower cost. At
the same time, given their dependence on each other’s performance, they would be
motivated to monitor the other supplier to ensure that it is contributing its share.
Jiang (2009), for instance, found that peer-to-peer governance is more effective for
getting supplier compliance than buyer-to-supplier governance in the Chinese apparel
and textile industry.
The “Coach” case in Wu and Choi (2005) (see Table 1.1(b)) demonstrates the
mutual monitoring effect in the buyer-supplier relationship. By successfully creating
a context for the two suppliers to engage in information sharing, the buying firm in
essence has devised a mutual monitoring system utilizing the co-opetition condition
between two suppliers. Also, Toyota initiated a context where its new US supplier
is matched with its Japanese supplier to solve both technical and contractual is-
sues (Tezuka, 1997; Dyer and Ouchi, 1993). In such conditions, the paired suppliers
are motivated to monitor each other. Ultimately, such a supplier-supplier relationship
reduces the monitoring costs from the buyer’s perspective since the cost of mutual
monitoring is less than the cost of direct monitoring by the buyer.
For mutual monitoring to work well, the two suppliers may be in the same business
but not in direct competition. A good example comes from the practice of parallel
sourcing (Richardson, 1993), wherein suppliers that have the same capabilities are
brought together and given contracts for different product lines. They have the same
capabilities (e.g., tire manufacturing) but do not compete head on because each is
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given a contract for different models (e.g., tires for a sedan, tires for an SUV, etc.).
These suppliers are motivated to monitor each other because of the future implications
of their present performance. In general, indirect links can enable supplier-to-supplier
monitoring.
P2: Indirect links when connected through another buyer’s supplier can be a means
for the buyer to monitor the focal supplier in the buyer-supplier dyad.
1.3.3 The Effect of Power Change Enabled by Indirect Links
According to the agency theory literature, the distribution of power between the
principal and the agent is a critical factor (Fama, 1980). Combining agency theory
and the power research, Saam (2007) argued that agency problems and the solution
mechanisms should be considered as power phenomena because, as a principal and
an agent interact, both jockey for leverage to potentially influence the other party’s
beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors 2 . Although the buyer, as the principal, generally has
more power than the agent because it can terminate the contract and contract with
other suppliers to perform the work (Tosi Jr. and Gomez-Mejia, 1989), in reality this
may not always be the case. For example, Canils and Gelderman (2007) found that
the relative power and interdependence between a buyer and its supplier differs in
each quadrant of the Kraljic portfolio matrix (Kraljic, 1983). For instance, suppliers
have more power over buyers when dealing with bottleneck items. Therefore, an
important consideration in overcoming the agency problem is to change the power
2Power, in general, refers to one party’s potential to influence another party’s belief, attitude or
behavior (French & Raven, 1959). Among the six bases of power, reward and coercive power are
considered mediated because their use is controlled and meditated by the influencing agent, while
expert, referent and legitimate power are considered non-mediated, because the effects are based on
the target’s perception (Tedeschi et al, 1972; Zhao et al, 2008). The locus of mediated powers is
decisively dyadic in that the power dynamics are contained in the principal-agent relationship. The
source of non-mediated power, in contrast, is dependent on the agent’s perception, and to that end,
the locus of power rests with the agent. In this regard, the non-mediated power bases are more
conducive to looking outside the immediate buyer-supplier dyad. Therefore, we focus our discussion
on the non-mediated powers.
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distribution. There are several types of indirect links that the buyer could build on
to redistribute the power in its favor.
Through the supplier’s other customer
In order to increase the supplier’s relationship commitment and address agency
problems, a buyer seeks ways to increase its power over the supplier (Benton and
Maloni, 2005; Maloni and Benton, 2000; Zhao et al., 2008). One way to increase the
buyer’s power is to build a coalition with another customer of the supplier, whom the
supplier depends on. When the power distribution in a buyer-supplier relationship
favors the supplier, the buyer is likely to form a coalition with other buyers in the
supply network (Bastl et al., 2013). When facing a powerful supplier, suppliers can
form a purchasing consortium; for instance, farmers formed “co-ops” many decades
ago, which was in essence buyers joining together and redistributing the negotiation
power in their favor (Hendrick, 1996).
Through the supplier’s direct competitor
Another way to change the power distribution is to have the buyer connect with
a direct competitor of the supplier. In essence, a supplier’s power over the buyer
comes from the buyer’s dependence on it (Emerson, 1962). The buyer could depend
on the supplier to achieve certain goals because the supplier possess scarce resources
(Dahl, 1957). These resources can include financial capital, human talent, techno-
logical skills, and the linkages between a focal firm and members of its supply chain
(Rungtusanatham et al., 2003; Barney, 1991; Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). In par-
ticular, Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest that an alternative mechanism to allocate
power is “access”, defined as “the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource” (p.
388). Hickson et al. (1971) also argue that actors need to be interlinked to gain power,
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because it is their connections that make their resources valuable, not necessarily the
possession of resources per se. In contrast, if the buyer gains access to such resources,
the supplier’s relative power is reduced(Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Rajan and
Zingales, 1998). As the power of the supplier decreases due to the introduction of
competition through the indirect links, the supplier is more likely to act in the buyer’s
interest.
Through the buyer’s customer
The buyer can also increase its own power over the supplier by creating an indirect
link through its own customer. Similar to a coalition with the supplier’s other cus-
tomer, the buyer can work with its own customer who may possess more leverage over
the supplier. In the construction example shown in Table 1.1(d), the construction
company as the buyer failed to have its supplier meet cost and delivery targets after
trying many different approaches. Eventually it was able to overcome the problem
by turning to its customer for help. Because this customer is the key player of many
overseas projects and controls resources that the supplier depends on, by forming a
coalition with the customer, the buyer increased its leverage over the supplier and
was able to obtain the supplier’s compliance.
With an organization that is central in the inter-organizational network
Last but not least, the buyer can increase its power by connecting with an orga-
nization that is central in the network in which the buyer-supplier dyad is embedded.
This central firm can be any firm in the extended network. In other words, the benefit
created by the indirect links with this central organization comes from its centrality
in the network rather than its direct interaction with the buyer-supplier dyad.
In particular, an actor is considered central in a network when it has connections
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to many other actors, also called degree centrality 3 . Due to these connections, a
central actor has information advantage and power over peripheral actors. This idea
comes from social network theory (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973, 1985), and has
received considerable attention in the management literature (Astley and Sachdeva,
1984; Ibarra, 1993; Mizruchi and Bunting, 1981; Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008) and
supply chain management literature (Kim et al., 2011; Carter et al., 2007). High
centrality can be achieved not only through increasing the number of links (i.e. high
degree centrality), but also through linking to other central actors (i.e., high Eigen-
vector centrality) (Bonacich, 1972, 1987, 2007; Mizruchi and Bunting, 1981). In
particular, a buyer can gain power over the supplier by connecting to a central node.
LGE increased its power by connecting to TSMC, which is considered to be central.
Similarly, in the example provided in Table 1d, company C increased its power over
company E by connecting to company B, which is central in the overseas construction
industry network.
In sum, the buyer can potentially change the power distribution with regard to
the focal supplier by connecting with the supplier’s other customer, the supplier’s
direct competitor, the buyer’s customer, and a central third-organization. When the
change in power favors the buyer, the supplier is more likely to comply with the
buyer’s request and to behave in the buyer’s interest.
P3: Indirect links external to the buyer-supplier dyad can affect the power distribution
in a way that allows the buyer to gain leverage to reduce the supplier’s behavioral
uncertainty caused by agency problems internal to the buyer-supplier dyad.
3Other types of centrality, such as betweenness, and closeness centrality, can have a similar impact
as the degree centrality. Thus for reasons of parsimony, they will not be discussed in this paper.
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1.3.4 The Effect of Network Governance Enabled by Indirect Links
Connecting with a central third-organization not only increases the buyer’s power,
but also enables the effect of network governance mechanism. The buyer changes
structural embeddedness, a key to the network governance mechanism, in its favor in
the inter-organization network (Jones et al., 1997). According to Granovetter(1985;
1992), structural embeddedness “is a function of how many participants interact with
one another, how likely future interactions are among participants, and how likely
participants are to talk about these interactions” (Jones et al., 1997, p.927). In other
words, as the structural embeddedness increases, the actors are more likely and have
greater interest in obtaining and sharing the information about one another (Burt,
1992). Therefore, when the indirect links go through a central actor, the dyadic
interaction between the focal buyer and supplier could be discovered by the other
actors in the network more easily, and, therefore, the focal dyad is more embedded
in the network.
According to Jones and the colleagues (1997), network embeddedness enables the
mechanism of network governance, in addition to markets or hierarchies (Williamson,
1998). Network governance can resolve exchange problems through the social mech-
anism of collective sanctions and reputation. Collective sanctions reduce behavioral
uncertainty by demonstrating the consequences of violating norms and values, in-
creasing the costs of opportunism, and decreasing the costs of monitoring to any
one party (Jones et al., 1997). With the indirect links through a central node, the
supplier’s behavior is more likely to be known and shared by the other actors in the
network. In case its behavior violates group norms (e.g., shirking), not only the buyer
but also other organizations can engage in exacting remedial actions against this sup-
plier (i.e., poor reputation). Therefore, the indirect links through a central actor can
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help safeguard transactions in the buyer-supplier dyad.
In addition, the increase of network embeddedness derived from connecting with
a central node also increase the ease through which the supplier’s reputation infor-
mation can be channeled. In general, a firm’s reputation refers to the perceptions
by a firm’s audience (e.g., the firm’s customers) about how well the firm can pro-
vide value compared with its competitors (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Hess Jr, 2008;
Philippe and Durand, 2011). According to the agency theory literature (Fama, 1980;
Fama and Jensen, 1983), reputation plays an important role in the agent’s objec-
tive function so that it is influential to the agent’s behavior (Jacobides and Croson,
2001; Wagner et al., 2011). Since a favorable reputation is notoriously difficult to de-
velop (Flanagan and O’shaughnessy, 2005) and usually requires significant long-term
investment (Doney and Cannon, 1997), firms are reluctant to jeopardize their repu-
tation and develop strategies to avoid reputation threats and damages (Telser, 1980).
However, when the supplier is embedded in a sparse network or the buyer-supplier
dyad is isolated from the majority of the network, the diffusion of agency problems,
as a reputation threatening issue for the supplier, would be less and slower (Borgatti
and Foster, 2003; Granovetter, 1985). The supplier can effectively limit the negative
impact on reputation by blocking the signaling channels.
We propose that the formation of the indirect links through a central actor can
facilitate the channels of the reputation signaling process so that the supplier has to
change its actual behavior in order to limit the negative impact of agency problems on
its reputation. By creating a link to a well-connected firm in the network, there is a
better chance that the supplier’s behaviors will be known to the market (Granovetter,
1985). Therefore, by connecting to a central node, the buyer increases the supplier’s
concern of its reputation and unblock the channels for the reputation signaling pro-
cess, and therefore deters the supplier’s deceptive behavior (Parkhe, 1993).
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In sum, by connecting through a central actor in the network, the buyer-supplier
dyad increases its network embeddedness which enables the mechanism of network
governance. Through the effect of collective sanctions and reputation, the supplier is
likely to behave in the buyer’s interest, and thus, the supplier’s behavioral uncertainty
decreases.
P4: Indirect links through a central third-organization provide the buyer a network
governance structure to manage the focal supplier’s behavioral uncertainty caused
by agency problems.
1.3.5 Caveat Emptor: Risks of Using Indirect Links to Overcome Agency Problems
Indirect links, as we have argued, are instrumental in enabling information ex-
change and mutual monitoring, changing the power distribution between the buyer
and supplier, and facilitating network governance. However, there are risks. First,
indirect links create another principal-agent relationship between the buyer and the
third node. That means, the buyer may end up having to deal with the agency prob-
lem it was trying to overcome with its supplier. If the principal-agent relationship
with the third node incurs high agency costs, the buyer might end up with higher
total agency costs. For example, a buyer could have to invest a lot of effort to coor-
dinate communication and supply activities of two competing suppliers, though the
original intention could be to create the mutual monitoring mechanism between the
two suppliers.
In addition, just as the buyer could gain power from the indirect links, the supplier
could use the same approach to increase its own power. For example, the supplier
could intentionally connect to the buyer’s customer or form a coalition with another
supplier. In either case, the changes in power distribution, enabled by introducing the
indirect links, would be favorable for the supplier. The situation can be worse if the
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two suppliers collude through the indirect links (Bajari and Summers, 2002; Gupta,
2002). For example, if the buyer works with another supplier to intervene in the
current buyer-supplier dyad, the new supplier can turn against the buyer and have a
“side contract” with the incumbent supplier (Mookherjee and Tsumagari, 2004). In
practice, the buyer may need to intentionally avoid sharing the name of one supplier
with another to avoid such problems. Therefore, the use of indirect links needs to be
carefully implemented and managed.
Furthermore, the buyer is likely to face resistant from the supplier. The supplier
would resist disclosing its suppliers or customer information to the buyer in order to
avoid losing power. Directed sourcing, where an organization’s sourcing decision is
directed by another organization, has been used by leading companies, such as Apple,
Dell, HP, Honda, IBM, LG electronics, and Toyota, to strengthen their own ability
to innovate, cut costs, and manage risk (Choi and Linton, 2011). Honda of America,
for example, often contracts directly with key second- and third-tier suppliers and
then asks its top-tier suppliers to receive the contracted parts. In this case, the
top-tier suppliers manage the quality and delivery, while Honda manages costs and
technologies (Choi and Hong, 2002; Choi and Linton, 2011). Although this practice
is beneficial to Honda, its top-tier suppliers may suffer from losing control over the
lower-tier suppliers because these lower-tier suppliers “are usually ‘more loyal’ to the
final assembler than to the top-tier supplier, and in turn, they would be less responsive
to the top-tier requests regarding quality or delivery” (Choi and Hong, 2002, p.486).
In this case, the supplier will try to avoid the situation by holding more information
from the buyer, and thus, will further increase the level of information asymmetry
and the agency cost.
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1.4 Discussion
We extend the context of agency theory beyond the dyadic context. We propose
the use of a third node through which indirect links are established and argue that
a buyer can decrease agency costs through indirect links. We identify four positions
involving the third node that can allow for such links: the supplier’s supplier, sup-
plier’s customer, buyer’s other supplier, and buyer’s customer. Four propositions are
formulated by arguing how the indirect links enable effects of information exchange,
mutual monitoring, power redistribution, and network governance, all of which can
reduce agency costs. We also discuss the limitation of the indirect links approach in
terms of how the new third node can interfere with the original intent and how the
supplier could resist. In conclusion, we believe that the indirect links can clearly af-
fect the existing principal-agent dynamics in the buyer-supplier dyad. We have tried
to articulate how such indirect links may help address agency problems.
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we extend agency theory
beyond the principal-agent dyad. As such, we offer a novel and broader perspective
to inform and address agency problems and we demonstrate how it can be applied in
the buyer-supplier context. Second, with this new perspective, we identify an alter-
native way to overcome agency problems, complementary to traditional approaches
such as monitoring and incentives. Just as there are different practices that can serve
the purpose of monitoring and incentivizing, there can be more than one set of indi-
rect links (i.e., links go through different actors in the common network) of the focal
dyad that can overcome the agency problem. By looking beyond the dyad, scholars
and practitioners are exposed to a larger view–the network. In particular, we iden-
tify four positions of the third node that creates the indirect link. In addition, four
different mechanisms that can reduce agency cost are identified—they are informa-
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tion exchange, mutual monitoring, power reconfiguration, and network governance.
Therefore, the selection of the indirect links should be based on the nature of the
problem and the benefits these links can provide.
Future research should empirically examine the propositions developed in this
paper. One should be mindful of the sensitivity of the topic (i.e., the third node
may be reluctant since it is outside the principal-agent dyad) and the fact that the
unit of analysis is triad (i.e. it may be difficult collect data from all three matching
partners). Given these observations, three empirical methods might be considered.
First, systematic case studies can be conducted to further refine the propositions,
where new properties and the interaction between the properties can be identified.
Researchers may have to look for triadic relational settings first and then try to see
which type of relational arrangements they fall into among the ones proposed here.
Second, scenario-based experiments can be conducted to mitigate social desirability
issues and simplify the network dynamic into a more structured context. Third,
researchers could employ computer-based simulation, including agent-based modeling
approaches, to model the behavior of the three nodes under differing scenarios. In
addition to empirical research, analytical models can be developed to further quantify
the impact of the indirect links on the principal’s agency cost reduction. A principal-
agent modeling framework may also be adopted to examine the incentive issues among
the different parties involved in a supply network beyond the dyadic context.
In sum, by extending agency theory beyond the dyadic context, we are able to
identify a new way to address agency problems (i.e., through indirect links). Given
the different nature of each agency problem, we should not expect a single best
solution. Pragmatically, the question of how to select the appropriate indirect link(s)
will likely be challenging. Managers will have to develop this understanding over
time. In addition, after selection, the question of how to manage these indirect links
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becomes relevant. We hope that we have brought to the fore the importance of moving
beyond the dyad when considering agency problems and new ways to overcome them
by incorporating the third firm.
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Chapter 2
ADDRESSING SUPPLIER OPPORTUNISM BEYOND THE DYAD: THE
EFFECT OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE
Abstract
Supplier opportunism is a common issue in supply chain management and has
drawn a lot of attention in literature. While the literature has mainly focused on the
effect of governance mechanisms that are within the buyer-supplier dyad, the effect of
network governance mechanism on the supplier opportunism is largely overlooked. To
understand the effect of network governance mechanism, two scenario-based role play
experiments were conducted using 312 managers with relevant experience and MBA
students. Structural Equation Models for experimental design was used for analysis,
and the results show that our hypothesized model is partially supported. In particular,
the findings in Study 1 show that the buyer’s level of embeddedness in the supplier’s
network reduces the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention, and the effect is
partially mediated by the supplier’s negative affection prediction, but not mediated
by the supplier’s predictions of the buyer’s reactions. The finding in Study 2 shows
that the buyer is more likely to engage in negative word-of-mouth (WOM) activities
and decrease its commitment to the supplier if the supplier’s performance is lower than
expected, which presumably is an outcome of the supplier’s opportunism. Our study
expands agency theory beyond the buyer-supplier dyad and investigates how network
governance curves supplier behavioral intention through multiple mechanisms: dyadic
and. network-level effects, as well as economic and. psychological effects. In addition,
this research provides managerial implications to both the buying and supplying sides
25
and to both business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions.
2.1 Introduction
Supplier opportunism is commonly assumed in transactions and has received sig-
nificant attention in research in supply chain management (Morgan et al., 2007;
Provan and Skinner, 1989; Wallenburg and Scha¨ffler, 2014). Both Agency Theory
and Transaction-Cost Economics (TCE) suggest that governance mechanisms, such
as monitoring, providing incentives, vertical integration, and long-term relationships,
are needed to curve the supplier’s opportunistic behaviors. Yet, all these governance
mechanisms are confined within the buyer-supplier dyad and may not always be ef-
fective. For example, LGE had difficulties working with Qualcomm, its CDMA-chip
supplier. Despite their long-term relationship, the two companies were constantly
jockeying for leverage (Choi and Linton, 2011). LGE worked hard to solve this issue
by adding incentive terms and by building a close relationship with Qualcomm. Yet,
the problem persisted. Interestingly, once LGE moved beyond the dyad by forging
an informal relationship with TSMC, its second-tier supplier that manufactures the
CDMA-chips for Qualcomm, it discovered that Qualcomm became more accommo-
dating.
This example illustrates the effect of network governance mechanism, an infor-
mal mechanism that works complimentary to the formal mechanisms within the dyad
(Jones et al., 1997; Tachizawa and Wong, 2015). By looking beyond the buyer-supplier
dyad, network governance theory suggests that the fact that the buyer and supplier is
embedded in a larger inter-organizational network could curve the supplier’s behavior
(Jones et al., 1997). In particular, network governance theory suggests that structural
embeddedness could curve the supplier’s behavior through social mechanisms, such as
macroculture, collective sanctions, and reputation. And literature generally believes
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that these social mechanisms evolve in a relatively long period of time and are consid-
ered as evolutionary (Axelrod, 1986, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Burtsev and
Turchin, 2006; Boyd et al., 2003). However, the example of LGE didn’t go through
an evolutionary process but the effect is instantaneous. That is, soon after LGE’s
chief procurement officer visited TSMC, Qualcomm became more accommodating.
Therefore, while the effect of network governance had been proposed two decades ago
and has been supported by some empirical evidence (Choi et al., 2002; Kim et al.,
2011; Wu and Choi, 2005; Wu et al., 2010), the underlying mechanism of the effect
is largely unknown. In particular, several unanswered questions are: If the effect of
embeddedness does not go through the effect of social mechanisms, how can it curve
the supplier’s opportunistic behavior? Must the buyer react to the supplier’s oppor-
tunism to enable the network governance mechanism? And when, if at all, will the
buyer would react to supplier opportunism?
Social psychology theories, as an alternative to the evolutionary view, could po-
tentially explain the instantaneous effect of network governance because these theo-
ries primarily explain how people’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior are affected by
the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others (Allport, 1985). Therefore, we
incorporated social psychology theories to answer the above mentioned questions.
In this chapter, two studies were conducted using the scenario-based role-play ex-
periments. In particular, Study 1 was designed from the supplier’s perspective to
examine whether and how dyadic and network governance mechanisms affect the
supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention through the supplier’s perceived costs
for being opportunistic, and Study 2 was designed from the buyer’s perspective to
examine when, if at all, a buyer would react to supplier opportunism. The findings
in Study 1 show that the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention decreases as
the buyer’s level of embeddedness increases (the effect of network governance mech-
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anism), while supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention does not differ among the
three dyadic governance mechanisms, namely a muscular, benign or credible rela-
tionship between the buyer and the supplier. In addition, the effect of the network
governance mechanism on supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention is mediated
by the supplier’s negative affection prediction but not by the supplier’s predictions
of the buyer’s reaction. However, the finding in Study 2 shows that the buyer is
more likely to engage in negative word-of-mouth (WOM) activities and decrease its
commitment to the supplier if the supplier’s performance is lower than expected, an
outcome of a possible supplier opportunism. Our study contributes to the literature
by expanding Agency Theory beyond the buyer-supplier dyad and by investigat-
ing how network governance curves supplier behavioral intention through multiple
mechanisms: dyadic- and network-level effects, as well as economic and psychological
effects. In addtion, our findings provide managerial implications that network gover-
nance mechanism could be effective through the supplier’s perceived internal loss and
that, although the suppliers do not consider the buyer’s reaction to the opportunistic
behavior when they are making decisions, the buyer’s reaction is very likely to be
noticed and to negatively affect the supplier’s future business with the buyer as well
as the supplier’s reputation to its potential customers.
In Chapter 2, we first provide an overview of the theoretical foundation for this
research in section 2.2. Next, we develop Study 1 in section 2.3; we first present the
constructs in the hypothesized model and hypothesize their interrelationships, then
discuss the methodology, including participants, quality control for careless responses,
the procedure of experiment, and validity checks, and finally present the analysis and
discuss the results of Study 1. We then develop Study 2 in section 2.4 which is
structured the same as Study 1. Finally, we discuss the results from both studies,
highlight the theoretical and managerial implications, and identify potential future
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research directions in section 2.5.
2.2 Theoretical Foundation
2.2.1 An Overview of Supplier Opportunism
Supplier opportunism, defined as “self-interest seeking with guile”(Williamson,
1993, p.97), is a key construct in exchange theory and has received significant atten-
tion in research in supply chain management (Morgan et al., 2007; Provan and Skin-
ner, 1989; Wallenburg and Scha¨ffler, 2014), marketing channel management (Crosno
and Dahlstrom, 2008; Ishida, 2007; Jap and Anderson, 2003; Seggie et al., 2013;
Stump and Heide, 1996; Wang et al., 2013), and strategic alliances (Lui and Ngo,
2004; Parkhe, 1993; Srinivasan and Brush, 2006). There are different types of supplier
opportunism such as adverse selection, shirking, refusal to adapt, breach of contract,
etc. The literature suggests two ways to categorize opportunism: ex ante vs. ex
post, and passive vs. active. Ex ante vs. ex post opportunism differ based on the
time when the opportunistic behavior occurs. A supplier can engage in opportunism
before the transaction (i.e., ex ante opportunism) such as the misrepresentations of
the supplier’s ability during the supplier selection process (i.e., adverse selection), or
after the transaction is in process (i.e., ex post opportunism) such as failing to fulfill
promises or obligations upon agreement by shirking (i.e., moral hazard) or using a
sub-optimal material. In addition, Wathne and Heide (2000) identified another way
to categorize of opportunistic behaviors, namely, active and passive, “depending on
whether a particular behavior (or lack thereof) takes place” (p. 41). For example,
shirking (lack of effort) and hiding information (lack of communication) are consid-
ered as passive opportunism, while deliberately misrepresenting facts (Shell, 1991)
and engaging in forbidden acts are considered as active opportunism (Ishida, 2007).
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Because ex ante opportunism generally occurs before the buyer-supplier relationship
forms and passive opportunism could be the result of ignorance, we focus on the
supplier’s ex post and active opportunism, which is common and generally associated
with higher costs in a buyer-supplier relationship.
2.2.2 Governance Mechanisms and Supplier Opportunism
Dyadic Governance Mechanisms
Governance mechanisms are “tools that are used to establish and structure ex-
change relationships” (Brown et al., 2000, p.52) and are needed to curve the oppor-
tunistic behaviors (Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson, 1993, 1998). According to Agency
Theory, the buying firm should monitor and/or provide incentives to the supplier
to decrease the level of information asymmetry and goal incongruence which reduce
supplier opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989). In supply chain literature, buyers could
use market-based incentives (e.g., increased volumes of present business and prior-
ity consideration for future business) (Giunipero, 1990; Krause et al., 2000; Monczka
et al., 1993) or relationship-based incentives (e.g., strategic partnership and supplier
development programs) (Choi and Wu, 2009; Dionisis et al., 2002; Kwon and Suh,
2004) to reduce the goal incongruence. In addition, buyers could also directly involve
themselves in the supplier development effort and dedicate personnel temporarily to
the supplier (Krause et al., 2000; Monczka et al., 1993; Newman and Rhee, 1990) and
adopt inter-organizational information systems (e.g. EDI systems) to monitor the
supplier and reduce the level of information asymmetry (Andersen and Buvik, 2001;
Carr and Pearson, 2002; Guan and Rehme, 2012; Holland et al., 1992).
However, agency theory predicts that monitoring inefficiency and a lack of perfect
incentives are the two main reasons for supplier opportunism. While the incentive
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approach transfers risks to the agent who are generally more risk averse (Eisenhardt,
1989; Lane et al., 1998; Tosi et al., 1997; Waterman and Meier, 1998), the effect of
monitoring is threatened due to measurement imperfection, multiple tasks in agency
relations, ex ante causal ambiguity and reactant caused by offending the agent’s sense
of autonomy (Baker, 1992; Brehm, 1966; Heide et al., 2007; Jacobides and Croson,
2001; Sharma, 1997; Tosi et al., 1997; Williamson, 1975). Therefore, buyers search
for additional governance mechanisms to decrease supplier opportunism.
TCE identifies market, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two as alternative gover-
nance mechanisms. In essence, based on asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency,
an organization would choose a governance mechanism that minimizes opportunism
and consequently transaction costs. While early TCE suggests that the buyer could
exit from the relationship via market exchange or vertical integration in response to
supplier opportunism (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1998), neither pure market exchange
nor complete vertical integration is common in buyer-supplier relationships. More
recent development of TCE suggests that the buyer could choose the hybrid form
of governance as an alternative to market and hierarchy (Williamson, 1993). There
are three forms of hybrid governance, namely muscular, benign, and credible, which
differ by the dynamics between the buyer and supplier, how the buyer uses power
and trust, and how the buyer react to the supplier’s behavior (Williamson, 2008). All
three forms are considered dyadic governance mechanisms that could reduce supplier
opportunism.
Network Governance Mechanisms
While dyadic governance mechanisms dominate supply chain management litera-
ture, emerging research also suggests the importance of embeddedness, the fact that
the buyer-supplier dyad does not exist in isolation but is embedded in a larger net-
31
work (Choi and Kim, 2008; Granovetter, 1985). Because of the embeddedness, the
network member’s actions and the outcomes are affected not only by the dyadic rela-
tions, but also by the other network members’ actions, relations beyond the dyad, and
the structure of the overall network of relations (Granovetter, 1992, p. 33). Accord-
ing to the network governance theory, network governance is defined as implicit and
socially-binding contracts based on which a network of organizations creates products
or services (Jones et al., 1997). Network governance, as alternatives to those dyadic
and formal governance mechanisms, works as an informal governance mechanism that
could safeguard exchanges and reduce the level of supplier opportunism (Jones et al.,
1997).
First, embeddedness enables information sharing (Granovetter, 1985, 1992). Ac-
cording to Granovetter (1985; 1992), network embeddedness “is a function of how
many participants interact with one another, how likely future interactions are among
participants, and how likely participants are to talk about these interactions” (Jones
et al., 1997, p. 924). In other words, as the level of embeddedness increases, the
actors are more likely and have greater interest in obtaining and sharing the in-
formation about one another (Burt, 1992). Due to information sharing enabled by
embeddedness, network governance can resolve exchange problems through the social
mechanism, such as collective sanctions and reputation. Collective sanctions reduce
behavioral uncertainty by demonstrating the consequences of violating norms and
values, increasing the costs of opportunism, and decreasing the costs of monitoring
to any one party (Jones et al., 1997). In addition, reputation reduces behavioral
uncertainty because a favorable reputation is notoriously difficult to develop (Flana-
gan and O’shaughnessy, 2005) and usually requires significant long-term investment
(Doney and Cannon, 1997) so that firms are reluctant to jeopardize their reputations
and develop strategies to avoid reputation threats and damages (Telser, 1980). As
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the buyer’s embeddedness in the supplier’s network increases, there is a better chance
that the any of the supplier’s opportunistic behavior will be known to the market,
which also increases the costs of opportunism (Granovetter, 1985).
Both conceptual argument (Choi and Kim, 2008; Pirson and Turnbull, 2011;
Provan, 1993; Provan and Kenis, 2008) and empirical evidence (Yoon and Hyun,
2010; Foster et al., 2011) imply that network governance, the effect of embeddedness,
reduces supplier opportunism through an evolutionary process in that opportunistic
actors will be punished, through collective sanction (Boyd et al., 2003; Axelrod, 1986)
or through reputation damage (Nowak and May, 1992; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998),
and exit the market eventually so that only non-opportunistic actors (also called co-
operative actors) survive. Yet, the above mentioned LGE example demonstrates that
the effect of embeddedness may not necessarily be evolutionary, which takes a long
period of time. Instead, the example shows that the effect of embeddedness could
be instantaneous in that no collective sanction or reputation damage occurred before
the supplier changed its behavior. Therefore, we examine the antecedence of op-
portunistic behaviors from social psychology literature to understand the perceptual
mechanism of network governance, as an alternative to the social mechanisms.
2.2.3 Decision Making of an Opportunistic Behavior
A homo economicus view assumes that individuals are self-interested and are util-
ity maximizers (Roth et al., 1991; Mazar et al., 2008; Henrich et al., 2001). Accord-
ing to this perspective, people would consider three aspects in making a decision on
whether to behave opportunistically: (1) the magnitude of rewards for being oppor-
tunistic, (2) the probability of being caught, and (3) the magnitude of punishment
if caught. These three inputs provide the basis for people to reach a decision on
whether to perform an opportunistic behavior in order to maximize their interests
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(Hechter, 1990; Mazar et al., 2008; Lewicki, 1983). For example, when a person faces
the decision of whether to rob a gas station, the three aspects to consider are: (1)
the expected amount of cash gained from robbing the place, (2) the probability of
being caught, (3) and the magnitude of punishment if caught (Mazar et al., 2008).
Among the three components of the antecedence, the punishment perceived by the
individual could be generated from external sources, such as financial punishment
from the court and relational damage from a buyer, and also from internal sources
such as negative feelings. In particular, psychological research has shown that peo-
ple internalize the norms and values of their society (Henrich et al., 2001; Campbell,
1964), which serve as an internal benchmark that guide their decisions. For exam-
ple, compliance with the internal values will provide positive psychological rewards,
while noncompliance leads to negative psychological rewards (i.e., negative feelings).
In this case, for someone who passes a gas station, his or her decision on whether
to rob the place is also influenced by the magnitude of negative feelings generated
from the act of robbing (Mazar et al., 2008). Therefore, as a person makes decision
on whether to behave opportunistically, not only should she consider the external
costs, but also the internal costs. On the other hand, these punishments generated
from either external or internal sources are the decision makers perceptions before the
opportunistic behavior occurs (if it occurs at all), not the real punishment incurred
after an opportunistic behavior. While the former is commonly considered in supply
chain management and economic literature (Henrich et al., 2001), the latter is largely
overlooked.
In sum, the effect of network governance on supplier opportunism lacks under-
standing, i.e., whether the mechanism is evolutionary as suggested in the theory or
instantaneous as observed in real world examples. To close this research gap, we
develop two studies to investigate whether the effect of network governance requires
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the buyer’s reactions, and when, if at all, the buyer would react to a scinario for po-
tential opportunism. In the next two sections, we first develop hypotheses, describe
the procedure of the scenario-based behavioral experiments, and discuss the analysis
and results.
2.3 Study 1
The purpose for Study 1 is to test the effect of network and dyadic governance
mechanisms on the supplier opportunism. While supplier opportunism is an organizational-
level action, such action is decided by one or more individuals acting as agents for
the supplier (Eisenhardt, 1989). Also, since we are using scenarios to manipulate fac-
tors such as the level of embeddedness and the buyer’s dyadic governance approach,
it is important to understand how an individual’s perceptions are affected by these
factors and thus change one’s behavioral intention. Therefore, we incorporated so-
cial psychology theories which primarily explain how people’s thoughts, feelings, and
behavior are affected by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others (All-
port, 1985). Since our studies rely on the participant’s imagination of the presence
of the buyer, the supplier, or the other members in the hypothetical network, social
psychology provides an overarching structure for our hypothesized model. In partic-
ular, both studies follow the structure that the manipulated factors (e.g., the level
of embeddedness) affect the individual’s perceptions and feelings which affect their
behavioral intention (Allport, 1985). The development of the hypotheses for Study 1
is described in details in the following section.
2.3.1 Development of Hypotheses
In Study 1, we develop and test hypotheses from the supplier’s perspective. In
particular, we investigate the effects of dyadic and network governance mechanisms on
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Figure 2.1: Hypothesized Model for Study 1
reducing the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention. We also examined whether
these effects are mediated through the supplier’s predictions of the consequences of
opportunistic behavior. The hypothesized model is shown in Figure 2.1.
First, we hypothesize that network governance mechanisms, i.e., the embedded-
ness, have a direct effect on the supplier’s opportunistic behavior. According to the
network governance theory, which integrated extended TCE to the network level,
network governance serves as an informal and social contract that coordinates and
safeguards exchanges through the effect of embeddedness (Jones et al., 1997, p.914).
The network governance theory has received large attention since it was developed
two decades ago, both conceptual discussion and empirical evidence has demonstrated
the effectiveness of embeddedness (Choi and Kim, 2008; Pirson and Turnbull, 2011;
Provan, 1993; Provan and Kenis, 2008). For example, Yoon and Hyun (2010) drew
empirical observations from research on East Asian network governance and found
that these informal mechanisms reinforce, substitute, or undermine formal mecha-
nisms, and the degree of these effects depends on institutional environments. In
addition, Foster et al. (2011) conducted an inductive case-based research to study
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gatekeeper roles in creative industries and found that gatekeepers (i.e. the buyers)
maintain arm’s length relationships with many bands (i.e. the suppliers) but are em-
bedded in dense information-sharing networks with each other. This finding provides
evidence for network governance theory in that “ties among buyers can reduce un-
certainty by spreading information about opportunistic actors and producer quality
while also diffusing cultural norms and practices” (p. 261). Finally, Choi and Kim
(2008) proposed that buyers are likely to perform better in supplier management if
they have a good understanding of the supplier’s structural embeddedness.
In sum, as the buyer’s level of embeddedness in the supplier’s network increases,
the network governance mechanism is enabled to safeguard the transaction. There-
fore, if the buyer is highly embedded in the supplier’s network, the supplier is less
likely to engage in opportunistic behavior.
H1: The supplier’s opportunistic behavior intention is lower if the buyer’s level of
embeddedness in the supplier’s network is higher than if it is lower.
In addition, according to the recent development of TCE (Williamson, 2008), there
are three types of the hybrid form of governance, muscular, benign, and credible, all of
which are considered as dyad governance mechanisms that could reduce supplier op-
portunistic behavior. In particular, the muscular governance approach assumes that
the buyer, usually larger, deals with suppliers “in a peremptory way” (Williamson,
2008, p. 10). Buyers that employ a muscular approach often provide suppliers with
rigid specifications and request the supplier to offer the lowest price based on these
specifications. Little if any collaboration exists under a muscular approach. “Mus-
cular buyers not only use their suppliers, but they often ’use-up’ their suppliers and
discard them” (Williamson, 2008, p. 10). The muscular governance approach reduces
the supplier opportunism because the buyer has power over the supplier and does not
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hesitate to use it. If anything goes wrong, the buyer is likely to transfer the finan-
cial burden to the supplier. Because the supplier will bear any consequences of its
opportunistic behavior, the level of supplier opportunism is low under the muscular
approach. Yet, this approach is considered myopic and inefficient because suppliers
would often “ask the buyer to provide safeguards, thereby to mitigate the risks, or
they will increase their price to reflect the added risk that they are being asked to
assume” (Williamson, 2008, p. 10).
The benign governance approach, at the other extreme, assumes that the buyer
naively trusts the supplier and uses cooperation to deal with any contingencies. In
other words, “trust supplants power as the key concept” (Williamson, 2008, p. 10).
This approach reduces supplier opportunism due to the collaborative spirit that the
parties are always seeking for mutual benefits. However, this approach too is myopic,
because if the payoff of opportunism exceeds “the discounted value of continuing the
exchange relationship, defection from the spirit of the contract can be projected”
(Williamson, 2008, p. 10).
The credible governance approach “differs both from benign contracting, in that
it is hardheaded (hence does not project benign behavior when outliers appear), and
from muscular contracting, in that it is not mean spirited” (Williamson, 2008, p.
10). A long term orientation and mutual gains also exist, but trust is tempered by a
recognition that the supplier might be tempted to act opportunistically. The credible
governance approach reduces supplier opportunism by considering potential hazards
and by developing credible commitments proactively into the contractual design to
mitigate these potential hazards.
While all three dyadic governance mechanisms reduce the supplier opportunism,
among the three dyadic governance mechanisms, the credible mechanism is most
effective because of the balance in using both power and trust. The muscular mech-
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anism simply transfers risk to the supplier which causes inefficiency and the benign
mechanism relies too much on the “cooperative spirit” and creates room for sup-
plier opportunism (Wallenburg and Scha¨ffler, 2014; Williamson, 2008; Zipkin, 2012).
Therefore, if the dyadic governance mechanism adopted by the buyer is credible, the
supplier will be less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior than with the muscular
or benign mechanisms.
H2a: The supplier’s opportunistic behavior intention is lower if the dyadic gover-
nance mechanism adopted by the buyer is credible than if it is muscular.
H2b: The supplier’s opportunistic behavior intention is lower if the dyadic gover-
nance mechanism adopted by the buyer is credible than if it is benign.
According to Jones et al. (1997), network governance can resolve exchange problems
through the social mechanism of collective sanctions and reputation. Collective sanc-
tions reduce behavioral uncertainty by demonstrating the consequences of violating
norms and values, increasing the costs of opportunism, and decreasing the costs of
monitoring to any one party (Jones et al., 1997). For example, Boyd et al. (2003)
examined the effect of altruistic punishment in an n-player game setting and found
that group members maintain a higher level of cooperation even as the group size
increases and concluded that group selection is more effective at maintaining altru-
istic punishment than altruistic cooperation. In addition, the increase of network
embeddedness also increases the ease for the supplier’s reputation to be channeled.
In general, a firm’s reputation refers to the perceptions by a firm’s audience (e.g.,
the firm’s customers) about how well the firm can provide value compared with its
competitors (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Hess Jr, 2008; Philippe and Durand, 2011).
Reputation also develops over a long period of time. For example, Nowak and Sig-
mund (1998) proposed and found evidence that reciprocal altruism not only occurs
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in a direct reciprocity, but could also occur even when the likelihood of repeated
interaction is very low if reputation, referred as an “image” score, could be obtained.
While both collective sanctions and reputation, involve a relatively long and evo-
lutionary process (Axelrod, 1986, 1987), real-world examples demonstrate that the
effect of embeddedness may not have to go through an evolutionary process but could
be instantaneous. In other words, when people are making decisions on whether to be
opportunistic, before the opportunistic behavior and any consequences occur, they
already are perceiving the benefits and costs so that they could choose not to act
opportunistically if their perceived costs are higher than the perceived benefit.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the effect of network governance mechanism on
supplier opportunism, the mediating effect of supplier’s perceived costs for being op-
portunistic. Two perceived external costs, namely negative dyad-effect prediction and
negative network-effect prediction, and one perceived internal cost, namely negative
affection prediction, are identified. The negative dyad-effect prediction is defined as
a person predicts a negative effect on current or future interactions with the focal
buyer resulting from a person’s behavior. Since the negative dyad-effect prediction
only reflects the interaction within the dyad, we hypothesize that it will only be
affected by dyadic governance mechanism used by the buyer, but not be the level
of embeddedness. Predicting the negative dyad-effect is considered as a perspective
taking activity which is an intrapsychic process of imagining another’s thoughts, feel-
ings, and actions from that person’s point of view (Williams, 2007). This process
enables individuals to comprehend and predicts another’s behavior based on their
understanding of previous interactions (Davis, 1989). Among the three dyadic gov-
ernance mechanisms, the benign relationship will have a smaller impact on negative
dyad-effect prediction than muscular and credible, because the buyers who adopt this
dyadic mechanism rely on the cooperative spirit and they trust naively. If the buyer
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is considered to naively trust the supplier and has been less active in reacting to the
supplier’s opportunistic behavior in previous interactions, the supplier would perceive
a lower level of negative dyad-effect. Therefore, we have
H3: The supplier’s negative dyad-effect prediction is lower if the dyadic governance
mechanism adopted by the buyer is benign than if it is credible.
The second perceived external cost is negative network-effect prediction, which is de-
fined as a person predicting a negative effect on its current or future interactions with
firms other than the focal buyer resulting from the person’s behavior. Similarly, the
supplier also needs to engage a perspective-taking process based on its understanding
of the buyer. Based on its experience with the buyer, if the buyer adopts a benign
mechanism, the supplier will predict a lower level of negative network effect than
if the buyer adopts a muscular or credible mechanism, because the buyer is consid-
ered passive, it is less likely that the buyer will share the information with the other
network members.
In addition, the supplier’s negative network-effect prediction is not only affected by
its interaction with the buyer, but also by how well the buyer is connected in the net-
work, i.e., the level of embeddedness. As the buyer’s embeddedness in the supplier’s
network increases, the buyers would have more opportunities to share information
with other network members so that the probability for the supplier’s opportunistic
behavior to be known by others will increase (Granovetter, 1985). Therefore, if the
supplier understands that the buyer is well connected to others in the network, it will
predict a higher negative network effect.
H4a: The supplier’s negative network-effect prediction is lower if the dyadic gover-
nance mechanism adopted by the buyer is benign than if it is credible.
H4b: The supplier’s negative network-effect prediction is higher if the buyer’s level
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of embeddedness is high than if it is low.
The third type of perceived costs is the negative affection prediction, which is an in-
ternal costs, defined as a person predicting negative feelings, such as guilty or anxiety,
after certain behavior. Social psychology literature has shown people have an internal
benchmark to evaluate self and other’s behavior (Henrich et al., 2001), and such eval-
uation will affect the way people view and perceive themselves and others (Aronson,
1969; Baumeister et al., 1998; Bem, 1972). For example, if people fail to comply with
their internal standards for honesty, they will need to negatively update their view of
self. As people generally want to maintain a positive view of self (Greenwald, 1980;
Griffin and Ross, 1991; Sanitioso et al., 1990), this contradiction will cause negative
affection, a source of internal costs. In particular, people feel guilty when they en-
gage in unethical behavior and feel anxious about being caught for such behavior
(DePalma et al., 1995; Eisenberg, 2000; Ruedy et al., 2013). In addition, the mag-
nitude of negative affection differs in different situations. For example, Mazar et al.
(2008) conducted experiments and found that people use various mechanisms (e.g.,
categorization and attention to standard) to allow them to engage in a limited amount
of dishonesty while retaining positive views of themselves. Furthermore, while people
have negative affective prediction before an unethical behavior, when the outcome of
dishonesty is associated with feelings of self-satisfaction, people experience positive
affective consequences after the actual unethical behavior (Ruedy et al., 2013). In
addition, research has found that people behave more dishonestly when rejected due
to emotional factors such as a desire for revenge (Baumeister et al., 2007; Van Der Zee
et al., 2016)
Therefore, among the three dyadic governance mechanisms, a muscular relation-
ship is adversarial and intense The buyer takes advantage of the suppliers and “being
mean” becomes a relational norm in such relationships. Since being opportunistic
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falls into the same spirit of the relational norm, in this case, the supplier either ad-
justs her internal benchmark to fit the relational norm or does not evaluate herself
negatively when she is opportunistic due to the rejection of efforts from a muscular
buyer. In addition, if the buyer’s embeddedness level is high, the supplier would
predict a higher likelihood for others to learn of her opportunistic behavior, which is
likely to cause a higher level of anxiety when she considers acting opportunistically.
Therefore, we have:
H5a: The supplier’s negative affection prediction is lower if the dyadic governance
mechanism adopted by the buyer is muscular than if it is credible.
H5b: The supplier’s negative affection prediction is higher if the buyer’s level of
embeddedness is high than if it is low.
Finally, we hypothesize the negative association between the three perceived costs
and the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention. In particular, both the nega-
tive dyadic- and network-effect predictions are considered as the supplier’s prediction
of the buyer’s reactions against the supplier’s opportunistic behavior. As the supplier
predicts higher levels of the buyer’s negative reaction, the perceived payoff for the
potential opportunistic behavior decreases. Negative affection prediction, the third
type of perceived costs, is the supplier’s individual feelings for engaging in the op-
portunistic behavior. The prospect of experiencing these negative feelings will also
curb unethical behavior because people generally want to maintain a positive view
of self and generally avoid negative feelings (Baumeister et al., 2007). Therefore, as
a supplier making the decision on whether to act opportunistically, if its perceived
benefits and the likelihood of being caught hold constant, the higher the perceived
costs are, the less likely the supplier would engage in opportunism.
Therefore, we have:
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H6a: The supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention is lower if the supplier’s neg-
ative dyadic-effect prediction is high.
H6b: The supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention is lower if the supplier’s neg-
ative network-effect prediction is high.
H6c: The supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention is lower if the supplier’s neg-
ative affection prediction is high.
2.3.2 Methodology
To test these hypotheses and ensure that causal inferences can be made regard-
ing the factors of interest, we conducted a scenario-based role-play experiment with
practicing managers (Tangpong et al., 2010; Kull et al., 2014; Rungtusanatham et al.,
2011). A scenario-based experiment was preferred because it allows the manipula-
tion of factors to be described in different scenarios. Such an experiment is most
appropriate for studying practices or strategies that are not yet commonly adopted
or for studying unethical behaviors (Rungtusanatham et al., 2011). Since the effect
of network governance mechanism is a relatively new concept to most managers and
supplier opportunism is considered deceptive, a scenario-based role-play approach
would outperform alternative methodology, such as using a survey or secondary data.
Participants
The participants were practitioners and part-time MBA students at a major re-
search university. Initually, 965 people (787 practitioners and 78 MBA students)
participated the study (including both Studies 1 and 2), among whom 349 completed
the experiment (either Study 1 or Study 2) and the rest were dropped from the study
due to lack of relative experience or failure to pass the quality control thresholds. For
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Study 1, 172 participants completed the experiment (151 practitioners and 21 MBA
students) using an online survey. The literature shows that MBA students and prac-
titioners share similar decision-making processes (Heisler and Gemmill, 1978). Unlike
survey studies, the mixing of participants is less an issue for our study because the
experiment is based on a hypothetical scenario, so whether a participant is currently
employed is not a concern as long as the participant has some related experience to
help them make decisions in the experiment. The practitioners were recruited via
a Qualtrics panel for a small monetary incentives, and the MBA students were re-
cruited in class for a raffle prize. Among the 172 responses, 16 cases were identified as
multivariate outliers in the Mahalanobis distance analysis (Meade and Craig, 2012)
and thus were dropped from analysis. Therefore, a final sample of 156 cases were
used for analysis.
Our experimental design follows recommendations by Rungtusanatham et al.
(2011). Specifically, our pre-design stage assured alignment with previous studies on
supplier’s opportunistic behavior (Kollock, 1994; Parkhe, 1993) and buyer-supplier
relationship (Tangpong et al., 2014). Also, in our post-design stage, a pretest was
conducted with 13 practitioners from a local ISM meeting to ensure that responding
managers would have no difficulty understanding the meaning of the related con-
structs. The feedback from pretest confirmed that the issue is quite common and
relevant, which provided evidence for external validity. Three rounds of pilot tests
were then conducted with both undergraduate and graduate students (215, 85, and
103 participants, respectively) from a large research university to refine the exper-
imental design, improve the measurement model, and ensure manipulation validity
(Rungtusanatham et al., 2011).
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Quality control for careless responses
Careless responses are a critical concern for survey and scenario-based experi-
mental studied because the validity of the study largely depends on how well the
participants understand the scenario presented and the questions asked. A series of
practices were adopted to identify careless responses suggested by Meade and Craig
(2012). First, we identified the median of time elapsed in the pilot tests and used one
third of the median as the threshold for identifying participants who rushed through
the study. Second, we conducted a quiz to test the participants’ understanding of the
reading material and the experiment would continue only if the participants answered
both quiz questions correctly. Third, we also inserted items such as “Please select
’Strongly Disagree’ for this statement” in the study. Failure to answer these items
would cause the study to cease immediately and the responses to be dropped. After
all responses were collected, a post hoc screening was conducted using Mahalanobis
distance approach which considers the pattern of responses across a series of items
to identify multivariate outliers. Sixteen responses were removed as a result of the
outliers analysis.
Procedure of Experiment
During the experiment, managers were first presented with a consent letter as
prescribed by institutional review board (IRB) requirements for human-subject ex-
periments. The general nature and intent of the experiment were given (e.g., to
improve understanding of buyer-supplier relationship) but not the specific research
questions to avoid giving cues. Next, participants were asked about their current and
previous working experience using a multiple-choice question. Only the participants
who claimed to have relevant experiences (e.g. supply and sales related jobs) would
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continue the experiment, and the rest were screened out from the study. In addition,
before the presence of the scenarios, the participants were required to acknowledge
that they had been informed that they would be presented with a hypothetical sce-
nario and would take their time reviewing the scenario. They were also informed that
they would be asked questions about basic facts provided in the scenario and only
those who consented to take this quiz and answered the questions correctly could
continue the experiment.
Manipulations
Next, the participants were presented with the hypothetical situation (an example
is shown in Figure 2.2). The participants were first asked to consider themselves a
sales manager in a supplying firm and were told that the supplying firm has a long-
term relationship with a buying firm that accounts for 20% of the supplier’s revenue.
The participants were then presented with one scenario that consisted of two
manipulation factors, namely the network governance mechanism, i.e., level of em-
beddedness of the buyer in the supplier’s network (high vs. low), and the dyadic
governance mechanism adopted by the buyer (muscular vs. benign vs. credible).
Each participant was randomly assigned by one of six (2 by 3) scenarios. Table 2.1
shows all levels of the two manipulation factors.
After reading the hypothetical scenarios, participants were asked to take a quiz
consisting of two multiple-choices questions to test their understanding of the read-
ing material. The experiments would continue only if a participant answered both
questions correctly. If a participant answered one or both questions incorrectly, he
or she would be asked to read the material again and re-take the quiz until both
questions were correctly answered. This ensured that the participants to read the
material carefully to obtain the basic knowledge for the experiment. After the quiz,
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Figure 2.2: An Example of the Hypothetical Scenarios in Study 1
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Table 2.1: Description of Different Levels of the Manipulation Factors in Study 1
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the participants were asked to answer a series of questions regarding the manipulation
factors for the manipulation check.
Measures of key variables
The third step consisted of answering psychometric questions about their predic-
tions on the impact if they were to behave opportunistically by delivering products at
a lower quality level than promised, and finally their intention to deliver lower qual-
ity products. For the psychometric questions, we limited the number of measurement
items to avoid fatigue while assuring content validity through pretest and pilot test.
A Q-sort test was also conducted to ensure the content validity in the design stage.
Measures were also included for other validity checks (discussed below).
In particular, participants were asked to rate their level of agreement to a set of
statements based on the scenario information (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree). The measurement model’s preliminary 12 items, which had been refined from
the pretest and pilot tests, were assessed using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).
We found two items required removal because of poor psychometric properties. Each
construct had at least two items, providing an acceptable measurement structure with
acceptable reliability and reflecting the theoretical content (Hair et al., 1998). The
details of the measurement items, as well as the reliability coefficients and the sources,
are shown in (Table 2.2) and are discussed in the results section. We note the final
dependent variable, supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention, is measured using
both Likert-type scale questions (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and a
continuous item (probability in percentage). Due to the different scales of these items,
we transformed all variables to the corresponding z-score value and used the z-score
values for all the analysis.
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Table 2.2: Measurement Model Results of Study 1
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Control and validation variables
In the last step, participants were asked for ethicality, risk propensity, and de-
mographic questions, which were collected as control variables. The ethicality was
measured using a mini role play scenario suggested by (Reidenbach and Robin, 1990)
because the opportunistic behavioral intention could be highly affected by one’s eth-
icality level. Risk propensity was measured using items developed by Meertens and
Lion (2008) included because opportunistic behaviors can be considered as risk-taking
behaviors. The following demographic variables were collected because of potential
biases toward opportunistic behavioral intention: gender, age, experience, education,
and race (Ribbink and Grimm, 2014; Tangpong et al., 2014, 2010). Other validity
measures are also included in this section (Chen et al., 2015). These items include “I
think the study is realistic,” “I think the instructions are clear,” and “I could imagine
myself in the situation.”
Validity Checks
To ensure internal validity, which is a strength of behavioral experiments, we first
randomly assigned each participant to one of the six scenarios. A multivariate test
was conducted to ensure that no confounding effects existed with the treatment level
to have a direct impact on the demographic variables in the model. The multivariate
test revealed no significant differences between low-high manipulations of any demo-
graphic variables: level of embeddedness (p-values ranged from 0.296 to 0.961), and
dyadic governance mechanisms (p-values ranged from 0.231 to 0.984). Therefore, no
confounding effects were detected. In addition, manipulation checks were conducted
to ensure the effectiveness of manipulation. One-way ANOVA was conducted to test
whether the questions associated are different across the different levels of each of the
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manipulation variable. The result shows that all questions are significantly different
at 0.05 level which indicates the manipulation was effective.
Social desirability bias is another concern in this study because of the variable of
interests in this study (i.e., opportunistic behavioral intentions). Several approaches
were implemented to mitigate this bias. First, we used “standard” vs. “premium”
quality levels to avoid undesirability bias created by using words such as “low qual-
ity” or “defective products”. In addition, for the dependent variable, supplier’s op-
portunistic behavioral intentions, we used the other-based questions for analysis sug-
gested by Fisher (1993). The questions were framed in the following way:
“For the next two questions, please consider another person, who is sim-
ilar to you, as the sales manager of SupplyInc... how likely is he/she
will deliver the STANDARD quality ’goods’ to BuyCo in the next ship-
ment...What is the probability of him/her delivering the STANDARD
quality goods vs. the PREMIUM quality goods?”
In addition, three social desirability bias items were also included in the demographic
section including: “I am always careful about my manner of dress,” “My table man-
ners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant,” and “I have never
intensely disliked anyone” (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). A post-hoc analysis was
conducted and the results show that the hypotheses tests results were consistent if
these items were added in the models. Therefore, social desirability bias was suffi-
ciently mitigated in this study.
2.3.3 Analysis and Results
We conducted the analysis following the structural equation models (SEM) for
experimental studies suggested by Bagozzi and Yi (1989). The SEM approach is pre-
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ferred over OLS regression because it takes into consideration the measure errors of
the latent factors, such as the negative network-effect prediction and supplier’s op-
portunistic behavioral intention in this study. We followed the two-step method for
analyzing SEM, where we first refined and assessed a measurement model for appro-
priate psychometric properties, and then tested a structural model for appropriate
fit and hypothesis testing using the structural parameters (Anderson and Gerbing,
1988). In particular, since our hypothesized model includes dummy manifest vari-
ables representing different levels of the two experimental factors, namely the level
of embeddedness and dyadic governance approaches, the Bagozzi and Yi (1989) ap-
proach was implemented using a mean-covariance structure and a series of equations
were created to test hypotheses related to the two experimental factors. Therefore, a
mean-covariance structure was used for both the measurement model and the struc-
tural model.
Measurement model
The CFA was conducted to assess the measurement model using EQS software
(Byrne, 2006). Only the continuous, measured factors were included at this stage
because the binary manipulation factors were to be entered subsequently (Bagozzi
and Yi, 1989). The fit statistics showed adequate fit with χ2(df) = 25.153(16) and p =
0.067, CFI = 0.983, IFI = 0.983, and RMSEA = 0.054 (with a confidence interval
between 0.019 and 0.081). All loadings were significant and above 0.6 (Table 2.2).
Furthermore, a CFA was done that allowed a latent common methods factor to explain
item variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In addition, adequate construct reliability was
achieved with Cronbach’s alphas of each factor above 0.8 (McDonald, 2013). Item-
level descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Item Correlations and Descriptive Statistics
Hypothesis tests
To test the hypotheses of the effects of the treatment variables (H1-H5), we fol-
lowed the approach for SEM testing in experimental designs where the estimation
method uses univariate tests of treatment variables by using a mean-covariance struc-
ture (Bagozzi and Yi, 1989). The goal is to focus on the means, in addition to covari-
ances, to analyze the hypothesized experimental effects on the supplier’s opportunistic
behavioral intention and the three perceived costs. In EQS, this structured-mean ap-
proach was accomplished through use of the V999 constant to estimate the factor
mean (Byrne, 2006; Kull et al., 2014). Dummy variables were specified as exogenous
latent variables with a single indicator and no residual.
Analysis was done with maximum likelihood estimation using the augmented mo-
ment matrix, which enables the use of the mean-covariance structure (Bagozzi and
Yi, 1989), and a series of models were tested. To test the Hypotheses 1 and 2, we first
constrained the paths of the exogenous factors equal to zero and then performinged
a Lagrange multiplier univariate chi-square test (LM test) to determine if releasing
the zero-value path constraint improved model fit. In particular, the direct effects
on supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention from embeddedness (H1) and dyadic
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Figure 2.3: Analysis Results for Study 1
governance approaches (H2a and H2b) were tested. The overall model results are
presented in Figure 2.3. The fit of the model is adequate with χ2(df) = 60.13(51)
and p = .17, CFI = 0.97, IFI = 0.92, and RMSEA = 0.03 (with a confidence inter-
val of between 0.00 and 0.07). Hypothesis 1, positing that embeddedness decreases
supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention, was supported (β = −0.172, p < .05).
H2, positing that muscular and benign approach would cause a higher supplier’s op-
portunistic behavioral intention than the credible approach, were not supported as
the LM test did not detect a significant univariate chi-square improvement for neither
muscular (with χ2(df) = 1.408(1) and p > 0.05) nor benign (with χ2(df) = 0.231(1)
and p > 0.05) which are represented as “n.s.” in Figure 2.3.
To test the effects of the treatment variables on the three perceived costs in H3
to H5, a similar approach was used in which the paths of the exogenous factors
were constrained to zero and then a LM test was conducted to determine if releasing
the zero-value path constraint improved model fit. H3, positing that the supplier’s
negative dyadic-effect prediction is lower in the benign relationship than in a credible
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relationship, was not supported as the LM test did not detect a significant univariate
chi-square improvement with χ2(df) = 0.674(1) and p = 0.412, although the fit of the
model is adequate with χ2(df) = 19.5(12) and p = .07, CFI = 0.951, IFI = 0.964,
and RMSEA = 0.064 (with a confidence interval of between .00 and .102).
H4a, positing that the supplier’s negative network-effect prediction is lower in the
benign relationship than in a credible relationship, was not supported as the LM test
did not detect a significant univariate chi-square improvement with χ2(df) = 0.492
(1) and p = 0.483, although the fit of the model is adequate with χ2(df) = 48.812(41)
and p = .18, CFI = 0.970, IFI = 0.971, and RMSEA = 0.037 (with a confidence
interval of between .00 and .61). On the other hand, H4b, positing that the supplier’s
negative network-effect prediction is higher if the buyer’s level of embeddedness is
high, was supported (β = 5.138, p < .05).
Finally, H5a, positing that the supplier’s negative affection prediction is lower in
the muscular relationship than in a credible relationship, was not supported. But, sur-
prisingly, the path is significant to the opposite direction (β = 1.606, p < .05) which
indicates that the adversarial nature of the muscular approach actually increases the
supplier’s negative feelings (e.g., anxiety for being punished). H5b, positing that the
embeddedness increases the negative affection prediction, was supported (β = 4.071,
p < .05). The fit of the model is adequate with χ2(df) = 28.069(16) and p = .03,
CFI = 0.962, IFI = 0.966, and RMSEA = 0.07 (with a confidence interval of
between .039 and .098).
The remaining hypotheses investigated the relationships between the three per-
ceived costs and the opportunistic behavioral intention (H6a to H6c). These paths
were tested following standard SEM parameter significance tests. H6a, positing that
the negative dyadic-effect prediction decreases the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral
intention, was not supported (β = −0.200, p > .05), as was H6b, positing that the
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negative network-effect prediction decreases the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral
intention (β = 0.174, p > .05). On the other hand, H6c, positing that the negative
affection prediction decreases the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention, was
supported (β = −0.359, p < 0.05). The above results suggest that, while managers
make decisions on whether to engage in an opportunistic behavior, they tend to focus
more on their own affections than the other party’s (the buyer’s) possible reactions.
Additional to the approach suggested by Bagozzi and Yi (1989), we also conducted
path analysis in SEM to test the mediation effects of supplier’s perceived costs. The
associations of informal and formal mechanisms with supplier’s opportunistic be-
havioral intention and the indirect paths via supplier’s perceived costs were then
examined using multiple mediation models performed with EQS 6.2 (Byrne, 2006).
Separate path models were tested for each exogenous factor respectively which is a
common practice for complicated models with small sample size (Gordon et al., 2016;
Prahinski and Benton, 2004). Each path model tested multiple indirect pathways
linking the respective exogenous factor (embeddedness or relational norms) with sup-
plier’s opportunistic behavioral intention through the supplier’s perceived costs (nega-
tive direct-effect prediction, negative network-effect prediction, and negative affection
predictions. The significance of each indirect effect (e.g. embeddedness→Perceived
costs→supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention) was determined using bootstrap-
ping with 5,000 resamples (Hayes, 2013; Gordon et al., 2016). Each model controlled
for gender, age, experience, education, race, ethicality, and risk propensity.
The results from the path analysis is summarized in Table 2.4. As shown in
Table 2.4, embeddedness was significantly and positively associated with negative
affection prediction (β = 1.429, p < .05) and negative affection prediction is neg-
atively associated with supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention (β = −0.435,
p < .05). This provides support for H5b and H6c. In addition, there are a significant
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Table 2.4: Summary of Path Analysis in Study 1
negative direct effect between embeddedness and opportunistic behavioral intention
(β = −0.570, p < .05) and a significant negative indirect effect linking embedded-
ness with opportunistic behavioral intention through the three perceived costs. The
results indicates that embeddedness decreases the level of the supplier’s opportunis-
tic behavioral intention and the relationship is partially mediated by the supplier’s
perceived costs. Therefore, H1 is also supported.
The results from the path model of relational norm show that the benign rela-
tionship, in comparison with the credible relationship, was negatively associated with
negative direct-effect prediction (β = −0.193, p < .05) and positively associated with
negative network-effect prediction (β = 1.163, p < .05). This provides support for
H3 but is opposite to H4a. The results also show that negative affection predic-
tion is negatively associated with the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention
(β = −0.370, p < .05) which also provides support for H6c. In addition, there is a
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significant negative direct effect between muscular relationship and opportunistic be-
havioral intention (β = −0.172, p < .05) and no significant indirect effect through the
three perceived costs. The results indicates that while muscular relationship decreases
the level of supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention, the effect is not mediated
by the supplier’s perceived costs. On the other hand, there is no significant direct
or indirect effect between benign relationship and opportunistic behavioral intention.
Therefore, H2a is supported but H2b is not.
While the results using the path models are largely consistent with those using
the SEM for experimental design approach, and it is preferred for testing mediation
models (Zhao et al., 2010), the path models do not address the fact that the two
exogenous factors are dummy variables, not continuous. Therefore, we still rely on
the results using Bagozzi and Yi’s (1989) approach for this study.
2.3.4 Discussion
The results of Study 1 show that network governance mechanism, i.e, the em-
beddedness, has a direct effect in decreasing the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral
intention and is partially mediated by the supplier’s negative affection prediction.
However, the hypotheses regarding that the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral in-
tention differs across different dyadic governance mechanism were not supported. An
unexpected finding is that the muscular approach causes a higher level of supplier’s
negative affection prediction which, in turn, decreases the supplier’s opportunistic
behavioral intention. While literature has suggested that adversarial/competitive
supply chain relationship decreases the relationship commitment and increases sup-
plier’s opportunistic behavior in a long term (Kim and Choi, 2015), in a short term,
as in this one-shot experiment, such approach could create a credible threat that
immediately decreases the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention.
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Another finding from Study 1 is that, among the three perceived costs, only the
negative affection prediction is negatively associated with the supplier’s opportunistic
behavioral intention. This find indicates that, while making decisions on whether
to engage in an opportunistic behavior in a transaction, managers tend to focus
more on their own affections than the buyer’s possible reactions. Since both the
negative dyadic-effect prediction and the negative network-effect prediction reflect
the supplier’s prediction of the buyer’s reaction, it would be interesting to examine
the buyer’s actual reactions. Therefore, we also developed Study 2, which takes
the buyer’s perspective in order to investigate whether and how the buyer reacts to
potential supplier opportunism.
2.4 Study 2
While in Study 1, we tested the effects of embeddedness and the dyadic gover-
nance mechanisms on supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention mediated through
the supplier’s perceived costs for being opportunistic: the prediction of the buyer’s
reactions such as spreading the words and terminating the relationship, and the pre-
diction of internal affection such as feeling nervous and anxious. As the saying goes,
“It takes two to tango.” Therefore, we developed Study 2 that takes the buyer’s
perspective to examine the buyer’s reaction to a potential supplier opportunism.
In particular, we investigated the effects of dyadic governance mechanism (same as
in Study 1) and the supplier’s performance outcome on the buyer’s negative word-of-
mouth (WOM) intention and relationship commitment with the supplier. Note that
the buyer’s negative WOM intention and relationship commitment were reflected as
the negative network-effect prediction and negative dyadic-effect prediction, respec-
tively, in Study 1, and that a low level of the supplier’s performance outcome reflects
the supplier’s opportunistic behavior in Study 1. Therefore, the two studies are highly
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Figure 2.4: Hypothesized Model for Study 2
related in that, in Study 1, we examined the supplier’s behavioral intention affected
by its prediction of the buyer’s reaction; while in Study 2, we examined the buyer’s
reaction given the supplier’s behavioral outcome. In addition, we hypothesize that the
effects of the performance outcome are moderated by dyadic governance mechanism.
The hypothesized model for Study 2 is shown in Figure 2.4.
2.4.1 Development of Hypotheses
First, we hypothesize that the supplier’s performance outcome has a main effect
on the buyer’s negative WOM intention. In particular, a poor supplier’s performance
outcome would increase the buyer’s negative WOM intention, which is defined as a
person’s perceived likelihood or subjective probability that he or she will engage in a
negative word-of-mouth communication. A negative word-of-mouth communication
refers to an exchange of thoughts, ideas, or comments that emphasize the negative
side of a product or a service, between two or more consumers, none of whom is a
marketing source. For example, they tell others, external to the transaction, of their
displeasure or dissatisfaction with a service and a service provider. Literature has
shown that bad events generally have larger impacts than good events. Baumeister
et al. (2001) has reviewed extensive literature on the positive-negative asymmetry
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effect and found that the bad events are more powerful than good ones in everyday
events, interpersonal interactions, and etc. In particular, people react more strongly
to bad than good events (Brickman et al., 1978; David et al., 1997; Nezlek and Gable,
2001; Sheldon et al., 1996). In addition, because bad information receives more thor-
ough information processing than good information, “the most widely read classes
of writers–journalists and novelists–both devote the bulk of their writing to elabo-
rating bad rather than good events” (Baumeister et al., 2001, p. 343). Therefore,
if the supplier’s performance outcome is lower than the buyer’s expectation, which
implies a potential supplier opportunism, the buyer would be more likely to share
this experience when an opportunity presents itself.
H7: The buyer’s negative WOM intention is higher if the supplier’s performance
outcome is low than if it is high.
In addition, the dyadic governance mechanism adopted by the buyer, defined the
same as in Study 1, could moderate the effect of the supplier’s performance on the
buyer’s negative WOM intention. If the buyer adopts a benign approach, in which the
buyer naively trusts the supplier and is passive in response to the supplier’s behavior
(Williamson, 2008), the buyer is less likely to react by sharing its experience with
others. Therefore, we have
H8: The effect of the supplier’s performance outcome on the buyer’s negative WOM
intention is smaller if the dyadic governance mechanism adopted by the buyer
is benign than if it is credible.
Not only does the buyer react to the supplier’s behavior through WOM, but the buyer
could also adjust its level of commitment to the supplier. As the positive-negative
asymmetry effect was found in literature, negative events and experience produce
more negative emotion, have bigger effects on adjustment measures, and have longer
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lasting effects (Baumeister et al., 2001). For example, evidence has shown that bad
information about a person or new acquaintance carries more weight and has a larger
impact on impressions than good information (Peeters and Czapinski, 1990). One
explanation for this phenomenon is that when people categorize other individuals, to
be categorized as good, one has to be good consistently, while, to be categorized as
bad, a few bad acts are sufficient (Skowronski and Carlston, 1989). In this case, one or
few negative experiences could jeopardize a good relationship. In addition, the SCM
literature suggests that the supplier’s performance and behavioral uncertainty creates
a performance evaluation problem that decreases the buyer’s trust and commitment
to the supplier (Kwon and Suh, 2004). Therefore, a negative experience with the
supplier will have a larger and negative impact on the buyer’s commitment to the
supplier.
H9: The buyer’s relationship commitment to the supplier is lower if the supplier’s
performance outcome is low than if it is high.
In addition, the dyadic governance approach adopted by the buyer should also mod-
erate the effect of the supplier’s performance outcome on the buyer’s commitment
to the supplier. In particular, if the buyer adopts a muscular dyadic governance
mechanism, the buyer is considered as acting in response to the supplier’s behavior
and behavioral outcome. In such relationships, the buyer has little tolerance if the
supplier does not perform and is likely to transfer the financial burden to the supplier
and to punish the supplier by terminating the relationship. Therefore, the effect of
the supplier’s performance outcome on the buyer’s relationship commitment is larger
in a muscular relationship than in a benign or credible relationship.
H10a: The effect of the supplier’s performance outcome on the buyer’s relationship
commitment is larger if the dyadic governance mechanism adopted by the buyer
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is muscular than if it is benign.
H10b: The effect of the supplier’s performance outcome on the buyer’s relationship
commitment is smaller if the dyadic governance mechanism adopted by the buyer
is muscular than if it is muscular credible.
2.4.2 Methodology
The hypotheses in Study 2 were tested using scenario-based role play experiment
as in Study 1. The two studies were conducted simultaneously and the participants
were recruited in the same way. As a potential participant signes up for the study,
she will be assigned to only one study based on her experience provided in the pre-
screening question. For example, after a practitioner agreed to participate the study
and had read the consent information, she will be asked about current or previous
working experience. If she reported to have experience on the supplying side, such
as a sales or account manager, she would be assigned to Study 1. If she reported to
have experience on the buying side, such as a procurement or supplier manager, she
would be assigned to Study 2. If she reported experience in neither supplying nor
buying, such as in HR or accounting, she would receive a thank you note and would
be dropped from the experiment. In this case, we assured that each participant could
only participate in one of the two studies to avoid the carrying-over effect, and the
study assigned matched his or her own experience.
Participants and quality control for careless responses
The participants were from the same pool as in Study 1. After the pre-screening
question and several validity checks to screen out the careless responses, 169 partic-
ipants completed Study 1 (150 practitioners and 19 MBA students) using an online
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survey. We deleted 13 cases, which were identified as multivariate outliers using Ma-
halanobis distance in SPSS (Meade and Craig, 2012). The sample of data analyzed
contained 156 cases.
As in Study 1, we randomly assigned participants to different one-shot, hypo-
thetical scenarios following recommendations by Rungtusanatham et al. (2011). We
have also conducted a pretest with 5 practitioners to ensure that responding man-
agers would have no difficulty understanding the meaning of the related constructs
and that the issues are common and relevant. Three rounds of pilot tests were then
conducted with both undergraduate and graduate students (164, 73, and 67 par-
ticipants, respectively) from a large research university to refine the experimental
design, improve the measurement model, and ensure manipulation validity (Rungtu-
sanatham et al., 2011). We used the same approaches to screen out careless responses
as described in Study 1.
Procedure of experiment
The procedure of the experiment is similar to the procedure in Study 1. During
the experiment, managers were first presented with the same informed consent in
which the general nature and intent of the experiment were given (i.e., to improve
understanding of buyer-supplier relationships). Next, participants were asked about
their current and previous working experience as a qualification to participate in
the study. The participants were also required to acknowledge that they had read
a statement informing them that they will next be presented with a hypothetical
scenario and to take their time reviewing the scenario. They were also required
to acknowledge that they will be asked questions about basic facts provided in the
scenario and only if they answer the questions correctly could they continue the
experiment.
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Figure 2.5: An Example of the Hypothetical Scenarios in Study 2
Manipulations
Next, the participants were presented with the hypothetical situation (an example
is shown in Figure 2.5). The participants were first asked to consider themselves a
purchasing manager in a buying firm that has a long-term relationship with a supplier
accounting for 20% of the buyer’s bill of materials (BOM).
The participants were then presented with one scenario consisting of two ma-
nipulation factors, namely the dyadic governance mechanisms adopted by the buyer
(muscular vs. benign vs. credible) and the supplier’s performance outcome in the
last shipment (high vs. low quality). Each participant was randomly assigned by one
of six (2 by 3) scenarios. Table 2.5 shows all levels of the two manipulation factors.
After reading the hypothetical scenarios, participants were asked to take a quiz
consisting of two multiple choices questions to test their understanding of the reading
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Table 2.5: Description of Different Levels of the Manipulation Factors in Study 2
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material in the same manner as in Study 1, and the experiments would continue only
if a participant answered both questions correctly. After the quiz, the participants
were asked to answer a series of question regarding the manipulation factors, which
are used as a manipulation check.
Measures of key variables
The third step for participants consisted of answering psychometric questions
about their attribution of the quality of the product received in the last shipment
to the supplier, their likelihood to engage in negative WOM, and their perceived
relationship commitment after this shipment. To control for potential confounding
effects from factors such as the potential impact of the negative WOM at both orga-
nizational and personal levels, the incidence for the WOM opportunity was provided
to the participants. In particular, the participants read a short description that they
were attending a conference and had met with another purchasing manager who could
potentially be the supplier’s customer and the participants were given an opportunity
to share their opinions at a causal event. This situation reflects the embeddedness fac-
tor in Study 1 in that the buyer has a certain level of embeddedness to the supplier’s
network and is able to share information. The description is shown as below:
“Now consider yourself attending a conference where you ran into someone
you had known from a previous conference. The two of you decide to have
coffee together. As you two are chatting, you find out that the company
which your friend works at is selecting a supplier for a big project and one
of the final candidates is SupplyInc. Your friend is in charge of the supplier
selection. Based on your understanding, the result of the selection will
NOT affect BuyCo’s business at all. Also, it’s common in your business
environment to comment on a supplier. And your comments, if you decide
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Table 2.6: Measurement Model Results of Study 2
to share, will NOT affect BuyCo’s business NOR your reputation. ”
Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement to a set of statements based
on the scenario information (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). For the
psychometric questions, we limited the number of measurement items to avoid fatigue.
The measurement model’s preliminary 9 items, which had been refined from the
pretest, pilot tests and a Q sort test, were assessed using confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA). We found one items required removal because of poor psychometric properties.
Each construct had three items, providing an acceptable measurement structure with
acceptable reliability and reflecting the theoretical content (Hair et al., 1998; Kline,
2015). Measures were also included for other validity checks (discussed below). The
details of the key measurement items, as well as their reliability levels and sources,
are shown in Table 2.6 and are discussed in the results section.
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Control and validation variables
In the last step, participants were asked for ethicality, risk propensity, and de-
mographic questions, which were collected as control variables as in Study 1. In
addition, they were also asked about their non-directional WOM intention for control
purposes. These items are: “How likely would you mention your experiences regard-
ing SupplyInc’s most recent shipment with your friend?” “How likely would you
mention your relationship with SupplyInc?” and “How likely would you NOT men-
tion your relationship with SupplyInc?” (reversely coded). Responsibility attribution
could also influences people’s emotional and behavioral reactions (Weiner, 1995) and
a responsibility attribution of a negative incidence will generate negative behavioral
reactions (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014) . Therefore, we also include measures for the
supplier’s attribution. These items include: “SupplyInc is responsible for the quality
in the last shipment”, “SupplyInc should be held accountable for the quality in the
last shipment”, and “Whether the quality of last shipment meet BuyCo’s expectation
should be attributed to SupplyInc.” Lastly, as in Study 1, other validity measures
are also included in this section (Chen et al., 2015). These items include: “I think the
study is realistic,” “I think the instructions are clear,” and “I could imagine myself
in the situation.”
Validity Checks
The validity checks followed the same approach as in study 1. To ensure internal
validity, we first randomly assigned each participant to one of the six scenarios. The
multivariate test revealed no significant differences between low-high manipulations
of any demographic variables: level of embeddedness (p-values ranged from 0.296 to
0.961), and the dyadic governance mechanism (p-values ranged from 0.183 to 0.971).
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Therefore, no confounding effects were detected. In addition, manipulation checks
were conducted to ensure the effectiveness of manipulation. One-way ANOVA was
conducted to test whether the questions associated are different across the different
levels of each of the manipulation variables. The result shows that all questions are
significantly different at 0.01 level which indicates the manipulation was effective.
Social desirability bias is also a concern in Study 2 because the WOM behavior
can be considered gossip, which is generally not socially desired. Therefore, we also
used the other-based items for analysis suggested by Fisher (1993). The questions
were framed in the following way:
“Now consider another purchasing manager who is similar to you. How
likely would he/she... (Be sure to give what you think others would do)?”
In addition, three social desirability bias items were also included in the demographic
section including: “I am always careful about my manner of dress,” “My table man-
ners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant,” and “I have never
intensely disliked anyone” (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). A post-hoc analysis was
conducted and the results from the hypotheses tests were consistent if these items
were added in the models. Therefore, social desirability bias was sufficiently mitigated
in this study.
2.4.3 Analysis and Results
We conducted the analysis following the SEM for experimental studies suggested
by Bagozzi and Yi (1989). In particular, we conducted a three-group SEM analysis
approach which allows us to test the interaction effect. Again, a mean-covariance
structure was used for both the measurement model and the structural model.
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Table 2.7: Item Correlations and Descriptive Statistics in Study 2
Measurement model
The CFA was conducted using EQS software (Byrne, 2006). Only the continuous,
measured factors were included at this stage because the binary manipulation factors
were to be entered subsequently (Bagozzi and Yi, 1989). The fit statistics showed
adequate fit with χ2(df) = 30.437(21) and p = 0.083, CFI = 0.983, IFI = 0.983,
and RMSEA = 0.048 (with a confidence interval between 0.000 and .078). All
loadings were significant and above 0.4 (see Table 2.6). Furthermore, a CFA was
done that allowed a latent common methods factor to explain item variance (Podsakoff
et al., 2003). In addition, adequate construct reliability was achieved with Cronbach’s
alphas of each factor above 0.7 (McDonald, 2013). Item-level descriptive statistics
and correlations are shown in Table 2.7.
Hypothesis tests.
To test the hypotheses of the effects of the supplier’s performance outcome (H7
and H9), and the moderation effect of dyadic governance mechanism on the supplier
performance outcome (H8, H10a and H10b), we followed the approach for SEM testing
in experimental designs suggested by (Bagozzi and Yi, 1989). In particular, we use
three groups to represent the three dyadic governance mechanisms, and a dummy
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variable for the supplier’s performance outcome. Due to the relatively small sample
size, we conducted the analysis for each dependent variable respectively to increase
power. The analysis included four models for each dependent variable (summarized
in Table 2.8). In particular, Model 1 consists of the dependent variable and control
variables. All the coefficients for control variables are constrained to be equal across
the three groups unless the LM test suggested to release the constraints. By doing
this, the number of parameters are considerably reduced so that the threat of lack of
power is reduced. Model 2 consists of the dependent variable, control variables, and
the independent variable (i.e., a dummy variable for supplier’s performance outcome).
Except for the control variables, most of which were constrained to be equal across
the three groups, all other parameters were allowed to estimate freely. In Model 3, the
coefficients of the independent dummy variables are constrained to be equal across all
three groups to test for interaction effect by comparing this restricted model to the
previous less restricted model. In this test, a high Chi square value from the LM test
indicates that the null hypothesis (i.e. there is no interaction effect) is rejected. In
Model 4, the coefficients of the independent dummy variable are constrained to be 0
across all three groups to test for the main effect by comparing this model to Model
3. Again, the Chi square statistics in the LM test indicate whether this constraint
should be released.
As shown in Table 2.8, there is no difference in the effect of the performance
outcome on the buyer’s negative WOM intention across the three groups. Therefore,
H8 is not supported. On the other hand, the effects of performance outcome on
the buyer’s negative WOM differs across the three groups because the model fit is
significantly worse in Model 3 than in Model 2, and LM test in Model 3 identified
that the constraints that restricted the coefficients to be equal across groups should
be released. Therefore, H10a and H10b are supported. Further, H7 and H9 were
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Table 2.8: Summary of Analysis for Study 2
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tested by comparing the fitness indices of Model 4 and Model 3 as well as the LM
test in Model 4. As shown in Table 2.8, both models are significantly worse in Model
4 than in Model 3, and the LM test in Model 4 identified that the constraints that
restricted the coefficients to be equal to zero should be released. Therefore, both H7
and H9 were supported.
2.4.4 Discussion
The results of Study 2 show that the supplier’s performance outcome will affect
both the buyer’s negative WOM intention and the buyer’s relationship commitment
to the supplier. In particular, when the supplier’s performance outcome is poor,
the buyer is more likely to engage in a negative WOM action and is less likely to
be committed to the supplier. In addition, a muscular approach between the buyer
and the supplier will increase the effect of the supplier’s performance outcome on
the buyer’s relationship commitment, while the effects of the supplier’s performance
outcome on the buyer’s negative WOM intention do not differ based on the dyadic
governance mechanism adopted by the buyer.
The findings in Study 2 provided an interesting comparison with the findings in
Study 1. In Study 1, when the supplier is making a decision on whether to deliver
products with a lower quality level than promised in the next shipment, the decision
is mostly affected by the individual’s internal, psychological concerns, but not the
prediction about the buyer’s reaction in respect of sharing words with the supplier’s
potential customers or to cease the relationship with the supplier. However, in the
Study 2, we found that the buyer will react to the supplier’s performance outcome,
i.e., whether the quality of the products received meet their expectations, by both
sharing negative experience with the supplier’s potential customer when an oppor-
tunity presents, and by adjusting its commitment to the supplier in the future. An
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interesting implication is that the buyer’s embeddedness to the supplier’s network
should be a critical factor to the supplier when the supplier is making decisions that
would affect its performance, as the buyer can and will spread the words, however,
the criticality has not been recognized by the supplier.
2.5 General Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter we hypothesize and find experimental evidence that the network
governance mechanisms, in terms of the buyer’s embeddedness in the supplier’s net-
work, influences a supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention, and that the sup-
plier’s performance outcome, as a result of their decision regarding an opportunistic
behavior, in turn, influences the buyer’s negative WOM intention and its relationship
commitment to the supplier. Our study invokes the importance of understanding the
effect of network embeddedness on a particular dyad within the network, and provides
a behavioral model that can be built upon by future research.
2.5.1 Theoretical Implications
There are several theoretical implications resulting from our findings. First of all,
in Study 1, we investigated the effect of dyadic and network governance mechanisms
on the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention and found that the effect of the
network governance mechanisms, which has been overlooked in most buyer-supplier
studies, is generally supported; while the effect of dyadic governance mechanisms,
which has drawn more attention in the previous studies, is not supported. While
dyadic governance mechanisms dominate the buyer-supplier and inter-organizational
governance literature, the network governance or embeddedness, should be considered
and investigated in future studies.
In a similar manner, this chapter pushed the boundaries of Agency Theory and
77
TCE by examining buyer-supplier issues beyond the dyad. While both theories as-
sume supplier (or agent) opportunism and focus on mechanisms, as such monitoring,
providing incentives, or vertical integration, in order to alleviate the supplier’s op-
portunistic behavior, the mechanism of embeddedness has been overlooked. Building
upon the network governance theory, we provided experimental evidence that the
mechanism of embeddedness is effective in reducing the supplier’s opportunistic be-
havioral intention.
In addition, the behavioral experiments developed in this chapter has provided
further details on how network embeddedness could affect the supplier’s opportunistic
behavioral intention. In particular, we hypothesized three types of perceived costs
through which the network embeddedness could be effective. While most of the supply
chain management and inter-organizational studies focused on organizational-level
constructs such as the impact of the buyer-supplier relationship on the buyer’s firm-
level performance, the detailed information on how individuals within the organization
make decisions is usually overlooked. This study contributed to behavioral supply
chain management literature by combining inter-organizational governance and social
psychology literature to investigate how the presence of embeddedness would affect
the decision maker’s perceptions and predictions, and thus influence their behavioral
intentions.
Lastly, this chapter proposed an alternative mechanism of network governance.
While the theory suggests that network governance could curve the supplier’s be-
havior through social mechanisms, such as macro-culture, collective sanctions, and
reputation (Jones et al., 1997) which all evolve over a relatively long period of time
and are considered evolutionary (Axelrod, 1986, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998;
Burtsev and Turchin, 2006; Boyd et al., 2003), our research proposed that the ef-
fect of network governance can be instantaneous. We incorporated social psychology
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literature in the development of hypotheses and found support in the experiments.
2.5.2 Managerial Implications
Our findings highlight the importance of network governance in addressing issues
within a buyer-supplier dyad. In addition to the dyadic level strategies, such as
supplier integration or building long-term relationships, the buyer could also consider
the mechanisms of network governance in order to address issues with a supplier.
This network governance mechanism could outperform traditional dyadic strategies
in that it does not necessarily create hostility within the buyer-supplier relationship,
and that the buyer’s connections to the supplier’s network is likely to exist directly or
indirectly already through inter-organization and inter-personal networks, but may
not have been utilized for supplier management purposes. Therefore, our research
proposed a new approach for buyers to solve problems with certain suppliers.
In addition, our findings revealed that the effect of network embeddedness on re-
ducing the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention is mediated by the supplier’s
negative affection prediction, but not the perceived buyer’s reactions. This finding
interestingly implies that the supplier’s awareness of the buyer’s embeddedness cre-
ates a credible threat in the supplier’s mind that immediately decrease the his/her
opportunistic behavioral intention. In this case, the buyer does not have to engage
in real actions such as terminating the contract or “bad mouthing” the supplier, but
simply makes the supplier aware of the buyer’s connections. This is similar to “the
shadow of the future” which is that opportunistic behavior is largely reduced if the
possibility of future business is high. Therefore, we call it the “shadow of network”
that refers to a reduction in opportunistic behavior if the possibility of a referral,
positive or negative, is high.
Our research also has implications for the suppliers. In particular, our findings in
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Study 2 reveal that the buyers are more likely to engage in negative WOM activities
when and opportunity presents and to reduce the level of commitment with the sup-
plier if the supplier’s performance did not meet the buyer’s expectations. However,
the findings in Study 1 imply that the suppliers usually overlook the buyers’ reactions,
and only focus on their own feelings, when they were making decisions on whether
to deliver lower quality products than promised. While the level of embeddedness
has a direct effect in reducing the supplier’s opportunistic behavioral intention, it is
not mediated through the negative network-effect prediction, yet, such a prediction
is very likely to be “realized” by the buyer if the supplier indeed chooses to behave
opportunistically. The implication of this finding is two-fold. First, the negative
network-effect does exist but has been ignored when supplier is making decisions.
Second, the presence of the direct effect and the absence of the indirect effect im-
plies that the supplier’s cognition of the effect of embeddedness might be low, but
their intuitions lead them to be more cautious under the high embedded condition.
Therefore, although the suppliers may have the intuition to make the right decisions,
it is also critical for them to be aware of the buyer’s level of embeddedness and to
understand the impact.
This research, although conducted in a B2B setting, it has an interesting implica-
tion for the B2C environment as well. Enabled by social media and online review sys-
tems, the effect of embeddedness is amplified and expanded to the largest extent. The
“six degrees of separation” is now shortened via the internet. For example, everyone
who uses Facebook is considered embedded in the Facebook network, and everyone
who purchases from Amazon.com is considered embedded in Amazon’s network. In
these virtual networks, online shoppers leave reviews of their purchase experience
and check other people’s comments before they make purchasing decisions. In the
case, the effect of the “shadow of network” is further strengthened because every
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customer can leave a review and every review can make an impact. The reviews are
especially important in the service industry because it is difficult to assess the quality
of service before it is provided and returns are highly unlikely in case of consumer
dissatisfaction. This is one of the reasons that crowd-sourced reviews platforms, such
as Yelp.com, TripAdvisor.com, and AngiesList.com are so popular in recent years.
As a result, there are implications to both the suppliers and online shoppers. On
the one hand, the suppliers who supply products or services on the online platform
should understand that the potential impact of every transaction is large and thus
should be more cautious about their behavior. On the other hand, the online shoppers
should be aware of their impact on the supplier and could choose to use the effect of
embeddedness to improve its purchase experiences.
2.5.3 Limitation and Future Studies
There are several limitations to this research that must be highlighted to motivate
future studies. First of all, our research includes two studies to investigate a buyer-
supplier problem from both sides. The benefit of this approach is that we could
control for many potential confounding effects by constraining the scenarios provided
to the participants. However, a more realistic setting of the study would be a dyadic
design in which two subjects participate in the study together, one plays the buyer
and the other plays the supplier, while the challenge is that the dyadic setting could
create noises and confounding effects during the interaction between the two subjects.
Second, we acknowledge that participants might not fully internalize our experi-
ment’s generic descriptions. Although we applied several techniques to ensure the va-
lidity of our constructs (e.g., by pretesting and refining the experimental instruments,
and by using a quiz to check the participants’ understanding of the description), we
recognize that the effect of network embeddedness, our main interest, is a relatively
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unfamiliar and abstract factor for the managers. In future studies, the experiment
could include multiple participants, some play the buyers and others play the sup-
pliers, so that the level of embeddedness could be manipulated by their connectivity,
which is more concrete and realistic for the participants.
Third, the dependent variables of both studies in this research are the manager’s
behavioral intentions, which is highly influential to one’s actual behavior. In future
studies, the experiment could be designed in a way that the actual behavior could be
captured. In line with the previous suggestion, a multiplayer game could be developed
to both manipulate the level of embeddedness in a more realistic way and capture
the participants’ actual behavior.
Finally, although our hypothesized model is partially supported, how the suppliers
make decisions regarding whether to engage in an opportunistic behavior is a complex
process. Other factors could be considered in future studies, such as the supplier’s
intuition and other cognitive factors to further understand the mechanism of the effect
of embeddedness on the supplier’s opportunistic behavior or behavioral intention.
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Chapter 3
DIRECTED SOURCING UNDER GOAL INCONGRUENCE: A MULTI-TASK
MODEL OF TRIAD
Abstract
Directed sourcing is an emerging supply chain practice in which the buying com-
pany, such as an OEM, bypasses its top-tier supplier and directly sources from second-
tier suppliers. Anecdotal evidence has shown that OEMs generally benefit from di-
rected sourcing due to a better control over cost, but top-tier suppliers generally resist
directed sourcing practices. Although several industry leaders adopted this practice,
literature on directed sourcing is rare. Thus, in this dissertation chapter, I formulate
a multi-task principal-agent model to investigate the benefits (or lack thereof) of the
directed sourcing structure to each of the supply network members, namely an OEM,
a top-tier supplier, and a second-tier supplier, in comparison with the traditional
tiered sourcing structure, and examine whether the directed sourcing structure ben-
efits the OEM, in comparison with the traditional tiered sourcing structure, under
different levels of goal incongruence. The results show that the incentives of the top-
tier supplier (or lack thereof) will be transferred to the second-tier supplier under the
traditional sourcing structure (a chain effect), while the two suppliers are competing
for incentives under the directed sourcing structure (a competition effect). In addi-
tion, directed sourcing generally benefits both the OEM and the second-tier supplier,
and such benefits increases as the level of goal incongruence decreases at the second-
tier supplier’s level, and as the level of top-tier supplier’s dependency on second-tier
supplier increases. On the other hand, the top-tier supplier is generally worse off un-
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der the directed sourcing structure because of the loss of power over the second-tier
supplier, which is consistent with empirical evidence that top-tier suppliers typically
resist implementing directed sourcing. This chapter quantifies the benefits and issues
of directed sourcing and identifies goal incongruence and supplier dependency as two
critical factors that affect whether and when directed sourcing is beneficial.
3.1 Introduction
After a decade of outsourcing, “manufacturers are delegating too much power to
top-tier suppliers and undermining their own ability to innovate, cut costs, and man-
age risk” (Choi and Linton, 2011, p.2). For example, Boeing, failed to deliver the
787 Dreamliner on time due to the lack of control of its supply chain, especially its
low-tier suppliers. The major delay, costing Boeing and its suppliers billions of dol-
lars in penalty payments and cash shortages, was caused by the shortage of fasteners
from a second-tier supplier, with whom Boeing had no direct contract (Greising and
Johnsson, 2007). In line with this example, research in supply chain risk management
found that the failure of low-tier suppliers can have a significant impact on manufac-
turers, (e.g., Kull and Closs, 2008; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008), and research in supply
networks also highlights the criticality of lower-tier suppliers on the buying firm’s fi-
nancial, operational, and innovation performance (Yan et al., 2015; Mena et al., 2013;
Hammami et al., 2014; Grimm et al., 2014). Therefore, industry leaders, such as Ap-
ple, Dell, HP, Honda, IBM, LG electronics, and Toyota, have adopted a “directed
sourcing” strategy in which they bypass the top-tier suppliers and directly manage or
contract with lower-tier suppliers in order to retrieve the competitive advantage and
to avoid losing control of their supply chain to the top-tier supplier (Choi and Linton,
2011). In this case, the top-tier suppliers manage the quality and delivery, while the
OEMs manage costs and technologies (Choi and Hong, 2002; Choi and Linton, 2011).
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While anecdotal evidence has shown that OEMs could benefit from directed sourc-
ing by improving their overall control over their supply networks and that top-tier
suppliers tend to resist the implementation of this strategy because of the lack of
autonomy, literature in this emerging sourcing strategy is still in its infancy (Kim
and Hur, 2015; Yin et al., aper). Because of the lack of understanding, companies
that follow these industry leaders may fail to realize the benefits or create problems
when they implement this strategy. Therefore, this dissertation chapter aims to fill
this research gap and promote the understanding of direct sourcing by quantifying
the benefits and/or issues of directed sourcing in comparison with tiered sourcing. In
particular, I consider a single product supply chain with three members: the OEM,
the top-tier supplier, and the second-tier supplier. Multi-task principal-agent model
is used to formulate any contractual relationship between the three members and the
goal is to compare the payoff of each member under the directed sourcing structure
with that under the tiered sourcing structure (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). The
difference between directed sourcing model and traditional sourcing model is mainly
the contractual structure, within which parties maximize their own payoffs. There-
fore, the research questions are whether and under what conditions directed sourcing
structure is beneficial to the OEM and the suppliers.
Key findings of this chapter are as follows. First, the incentive term to the top-
tier supplier and that to the second-tier supplier are positively related under the
traditional tiered sourcing structure (i.e., a chain effect), while they are negatively
related under the directed sourcing structure (i.e., a competition effect). Second, in
the case that there is no misalignment within any contract (i.e., the no misalign-
ment condition), the OEM can still benefit from the directed sourcing structure when
the supplier dependency (i.e., the level of dependency of the top-tier supplier on the
second-tier supplier) is high. In addition, the second-tier supplier is always better
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off and the top-tier supplier is always worse off in directed sourcing under the no
misalignment condition. On the other hand, in the case that the second-tier sup-
plier’s performance measures completely misaligned with its true contribution (i.e.,
the complete misalignment condition), the optimal actions and payoffs of each party
in directed sourcing are identical to those in the traditional sourcing. In addition, di-
rected sourcing generally benefits the OEM, and such benefit increases as the top-tier
supplier’s level of dependency on the second-tier supplier increases, and as the goal
incongruence level decreases at the second-tier supplier level.
This dissertation chapter makes several important contributions. First, moti-
vated by the emerging practice of directed sourcing, our study establishes multi-task
principal-agent models to examine and quantify the benefits and issues in directed
sourcing. While the directed sourcing strategy has been adopted by many industry
leaders and is believed to be beneficial, theoretical and analytical work to understand
this new practice has been lacking. Importantly, I examine who could benefit from
directed sourcing and under which conditions. Second, this study focuses on the im-
pact of goal incongruence at different tiers. I show that while the OEM generally
benefits from directed sourcing, such benefit decreases as the goal congruence level
increases at the second-tier supplier level. In addition, I also identify that the supplier
dependency is an important factor in this study. In particular, I show that the OEM’s
benefit from directed sourcing increases as the supplier dependency increases.
In the following sections, I first review relative literature on different types of con-
tracts in agency theory literature and different sourcing structures in supply chain
literature. I then present the model setups under traditional tiered and directed
sourcing structures and compare the payoff of each member under the two struc-
tures. Next, I develop two special cases and conduct a numerical analysis to derive
further insights. Finally, I conclude the chapter with discussions and suggest future
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directions.
3.2 Literature Review
Two streams of research are relevant to our study. The first stream is derived
from agency theory and studies agency problems in a transaction relationship. In its
essence, agency theory is developed to study “the ubiquitous agency relationship, in
which one party (principal) delegates work to another party (the agent), who performs
that work” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). According to this theory (Eisenhardt, 1989),
the major problem can occur in agency relationships is that the principal cannot
verify what the agent is doing, and the principal needs to choose the “most efficient
contract” to reduce the agency’s opportunistic behaviors. Although it has originally
been applied to the board-CEO relationship, in which the board is the principal and
the CEO is the agent, it has also been widely applied to buyer-supplier relationships
in supply chain management studies (e.g. Melnyk et al., 2004; Rossetti and Choi,
2008; Balakrishnan et al., 2008). In most cases, because the buyer pays the suppliers
to produce parts or provide services for further processes on the buyer’s behalf, the
buyer is considered the principal and the supplier the agent (e.g., Rungtusanatham
et al., 2007; Melnyk et al., 2004; Rossetti and Choi, 2008).
One way to improve the effectiveness of a contract is to provide incentives to the
agent by using an incentive term in addition to a fixed salary. In this case, the two
parties sign a linear incentive contract with wage (w) based on the base salary (s)
and the incentive term, where s is fixed according to the industry standard and the
incentive term is composed of the bonus rate (b, determined by the principal) and the
outcome of the contract. Ideally, the incentive term should be based on the agent’s
true contribution (y) to the principal, which reflects everything the principal cares
about, except for the wage which is determined by the market and is a common
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knowledge to each party. In this case, w = s + by. However, the contribution is not
always measurable. For example, the principal is likely to benefit from parts at a
higher quality, but the value of the high quality part could be difficult to access or
could not be accessed at the point of delivery. Thus, “objective contracts” (i.e., court-
enforceable contracts) based on alternative performance measures and “relational
contracts” (i.e., self-enforcing agreements perhaps based on total contribution) are
two alternatives for the perfect measurable contracts (Gibbons, 2005). Because the
former one is more commonly used in practice (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991),
I adopt this approach in this study. Under this type of contract, the principal uses
alternative performance measures, such as the number of units produced, with limited
adjustment made for quality, timely delivery, and so on, as a proxy of the agent’s
contribution. These performance measures are objective so that they can be easily
assessed by both parties and by the court. 1
Although with the obvious advantage, i.e., easy to implement, this type of contract
has a drawback: if the objective performance measures do not perfectly align with the
true contribution, this type of contract creates goal incongruence between the prin-
cipal and the agent because the agent’s objective is to increase its performance while
the principal’s desire is to increase the agent’s contribution. In particular, let p denote
such a performance measure and consider a linear incentive contract w = s+ bp. For
any given b, the agent’s incentives are to produce a high value of p, while the principal
benefits from increased realizations of the agent’s total contribution y. The divergence
between the agent’s incentive to increase p and the principal’s desire to increase y is
referred to as goal incongruence in agency theory. Such imperfect measurement and
goal incongruence are inevitable in any buyer-supplier relationship. While studies
1Other types of incentives, such as relational contracts, career concerns, and investing in capa-
bilities, have also been adopted in practice and been studied in literature. I refer to Gibbons (2005)
for a good review of agency model and incentive issues.
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have demonstrate that the use of this type of contracts generates goal incongruence
(also called “distortion”) and the impact on contract design, asset ownership and job
design (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992, 2002), it is unknown that how
this goal incongruence can affect other supply chain members under different sup-
ply chain structures. Therefore, I adopt this approach and expand the context into
supply chain triads to quantify the potential benefits for implementing the directed
sourcing strategy.
The second stream studies different supply chain structures. For example, Guo
et al. (2010) consider three outsourcing structures, namely consignment (similar to our
directed sourcing), turnkey with integration, and turnkey (similar to our traditional
tiered sourcing), in a three-tier supply chain and focus on how different structures
affect the information flow in the supply chain. In addition, Kayis et al. (2013)
consider delegation (similar to our traditional tiered sourcing) and control (similar
to our directed sourcing) in procurement in a three-tier supply chain assuming the
News-vendor formulation and find that the degree of manufacturer’s prior information
on the suppliers’ costs determines whether delegation or control is preferable. While
both studies compare different structures in a three-tier supply chain as our study,
they both focus on the information asymmetry and information flow and the impact
of information on each party’s decision and payoffs. Our study, instead, focuses on
the goal incongruence between the supply chain parties and compares each party’s
profit under the two structures.
3.3 Model Setups
I consider a three-tier supply chain that consists three parties, a manufacturer (M),
a top-tier supplier who supplies parts (P) and a second-tier supplier who supplies raw
material (R). The relationship among these three parties is modeled in a multi-task
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principal-agent setting. In particular, under the traditional tiered sourcing structure,
there are two contracts, one between M and P, and the other between P and R. In this
case, M is the principal and P is the agent in the M-P contract; and P is the principal
and R is the agent in the P-R contract. Under the directed sourcing structure, there
are also two contracts, one between M and P, and the other between M and R. Thus,
M is the principal in both contracts, and P and R are the agents in the M-P and M-R
contract, respectively. I use subscript M, P, and R to denote the variables associated
with each of the three parties.
Regardless of the structure, there are two actions (aR1and aR2) that R can choose.
The cost function c(aR1, aR2) is specified as
c(aR1, aR2) =
1
2
a2R1 +
1
2
a2R2
Both actions impact R’s true contribution yR and measured performance pR. In
particular,
yR = fR1aR1 + fR2aR2 + εR
pR = gR1aR1 + gR2aR2 + φR
where fR1, fR2, gR1, gR2 ≥ 0, and εR and φR are events beyond the agent’s control
occur that affect output and performance respectively, and are normally distributed
with zero mean and variance σ2εR and σ
2
φR
, respectively.
Due to the difficulty in measuring R’s true contribution yR, the measured perfor-
mance pR is used in the compensation term instead. There are two components of R’s
compensation, a fixed salary sR, a public knowledge determined by the market, and
a linear incentive term bRpR where the bonus rate bR is specified in the contract, and
the performance pR is measured after R fulfills the contract. To illustrate the issue
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of goal incongruence caused by imperfect measurement, consider the case in which
yR = aR1 + aR2 and pR = aR1 (i.e., fR1 = fR2 = gR1 = 1 and gR2 = 0). In this case,
a contract based on pR cannot create incentives for aR2 and so misses this potential
contribution to yR. In contrast, if yR = aR1 and pR = aR1+aR2, the contract based on
pR creates an incentive for R to take action aR2, even though aR2 is irrelevant to R’s
total contribution. Finally, in an extreme case such as yR = aR1 + ε and pR = aR2 +φ
, the contract wR = sR + bRpR creates no value at all to the principal due to the goal
incongruence.
Similarly, there are two actions (aP1 and aP2) that P can choose, and the cost
function c(aP1, aP2) is also specified as
c(aP1, aP2) =
1
2
a2P1 +
1
2
a2P2
Because P depends on R’s raw material to produce the parts, P’s true contribu-
tion yP and measured performance pP not only depend on P’s actions, but also R’s
contribution yR. Therefore, we have
yP = fP1aP1 + fP2aP2 + fP3yR + εP
pP = gP1aP1 + gP2aP2 + gP3yR + φP
where fP1, fP2, fP3, gP1, gP2, gP3,≥ 0, and εP and φP are events beyond the
agent’s control occur that affect output and performance respectively, and are nor-
mally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2εP and σ
2
φP
, respectively.
There are also two components of P’s compensation, a fixed salary sP , a public
knowledge determined by the market, and a linear incentive term bPpP where the
bonus rate bP is specified in the contract, and the performance pP is measured after
P fulfills the contract. Goal incongruence also exists at P.
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To analyze traditional and directed sourcing models, I first set up the model in
traditional sourcing and solve each party’s problem. I then set up and solve problems
in the directed sourcing model and compare the payoffs of each party under the two
structures.
3.3.1 Traditional Sourcing Model
In traditional sourcing model, the events are as follows.
1) M and P sign a compensation contract, wMP = sP + bMPpP .
2) P and R sign a compensation contract, wPR = sR + bPRpR.
3) R chooses actions (aR1 and aR2) which P cannot observe these choices and
deliver the raw material to P.
4) P pays R the compensation specified by the contract.
5) P chooses actions (aP1 and aP2) which M cannot observe these choices and
deliver the parts to M.
6) M pays P the compensation specified by the contract.
In addition, I assume every party is risk-neutral in this model. Under this as-
sumption, each party chooses the level of actions (as an agent) and the bonus rate
(as a principal) to maximize the expected payoff. In particular, I solve the problem
by first determining the optimal actions for R (aR1 and aR2) for any given bonus rate
(bPR), then determining the optimal bPR given R’s optimal actions and the optimal
actions for P (aP1 and aP2) for any given bonus rate (bMP ); and finally, determining
the optimal bMP given P’s optimal actions.
First, for any given bonus rate bPR, R maximizes its expected payoff E(wPR) −
c(aR1, aR2) by determining its two actions aR1 and aR2. Solving R’s problem, we have
a∗R1 = bPRgR1 and a
∗
R2 = bPRgR2, and the R’s expected payoff at optimal solution is
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Π∗R = sPR +
1
2
b2PR(g
2
R1 + g
2
R2). (3.1)
Next, I solve the problem of P who is both the principal in the P-R relationship
and the agent in the M-P relationship. In this case, P will choose bPR and the actions
ap1 and ap2 jointly to maximize its expected payoff E(wMP )− c(aP1, aP2)−E(wPR).
Solving P’s problem, we have
a∗P1 = bMPgP1
a∗P2 = bMPgP2
b∗PR =
bMPgP3(fR1gR1 + fR2gR2)
2(g2R1 + g
2
R2)
Let
−→
fR = (fR1, fR2),
−→gR = (gR1, gR2), and θR be the angle between −→fR and −→gR, we
have
b∗PR =
bMPgP3
2
−→
fR·−→gR
‖−→gR‖2
=
bMPgP3
2
||−→fR||
||−→gR|| cos θR (3.2)
where ||
−→
fR||
||−→gR|| and cos(θR) reflects the scaling and alignment of R’s true contribution
and measured performance respectively (Gibbons, 2005).
From equation (2), the optimal bpR, the bonus rate of the P-R contract, depends on
the scale ||
−→
fR||
||−→gR|| and the alignment cos(θR) so that it is the highest when cos(θR)=1, i.e,
R’s performance and contribution is perfectly aligned. The optimal bPR also depends
on bMP , the bonus rate of the M-P contract, and gP3, the coefficient reflecting how
much the performance of P depend on the contribution of R. b∗PR is increasing on gP3
indicating that when the performance of P is highly dependent on the contribution of
R, P will pay R a larger bonus rate. In addition, b∗PR is increasing on b
∗
MP indicating
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that when M increase the bonus rate to P, P is likely to transfer this increase to R.
This “chain effect” is common seen in practice: when manufacture gradually squeeze
the top-tier supplier’s profit by reducing the bonus rate, the top-tier supplier will
also transfer this reduction to the second-tier suppliers. The second-tier suppliers are
facing the risk of bankruptcy if they do not have much buffer to absorb the squeeze
of their profits.
Therefore, P’s expected payoff at optimal solution is
Π∗P = sMP − sPR +
1
2
b2MP (g
2
P1 + g
2
P2 +
g2P3(fR1gR1 + fR2gR2)
2
2(g2R1 + g
2
R2)
) (3.3)
For M, the dynamic is similar to typical principal in a dyadic model while take
into consideration that pP and yP are both dependent to yR. Knowing the optimal
actions of P and R given any bonus rate bMP , the principal can choose a optimal bMP
to maximize it’s own payoff E(yP − wMP ). Solving M’s problem, we have
b∗MP =
2(g2R1 + g
2
R2)(fP1gP1 + fP2gP2) + gP3fP3(fR1gR1 + fR2gR2)
2
4(g2R1 + g
2
R2)(g
2
P1 + g
2
P2) + 2g
2
P3(fR1gR1 + fR2gR2)
2
Let α2 = (fR1gR1+fR2gR2)
2
2(g2R1+g
2
R2)
,
−→
fP = (fP1, fP2, αfP3),
−→gP = (gP1, gP2, αgP3), and θP be
the angle between
−→
fP and
−→gP , we have
b∗MP =
1
2
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2 + α
2gP3fP3
g2P1 + g
2
P2 + α
2g2P3
=
1
2
∥∥∥−→fP∥∥∥
‖−→gP‖ cos θP (3.4)
where α is 1√
2
of the length of the projection of
−→
fR on
−→gR which increases in the
scale ||
−→
fR||
||−→gR|| and in the alignment cos(θR). In this case, α = 0 when cos θR = 0, i.e.,−→
fR and
−→gR are orthogonal; and α = 1√2
∥∥∥−→fR∥∥∥ when θR = 0 (cos θR = 1 ), i.e., under
perfect measurements.
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M’s expected payoff at optimal solution is
Π∗M =
∥∥∥−→fP∥∥∥2
4
(cos θP )
2 − sMP (3.5)
Substitute (4) to (3), we have
Π∗P = sMP − sPR +
∥∥∥−→fP∥∥∥2
8
(cos θP )
2 (3.6)
Besides the salaries, sMP and sPR, which are determined by the market, the P’s
profit is 1/2 of M’s profit. Both profits increase in
∥∥∥−→fP∥∥∥ and cos θP . In particular,
when θP = 0, i.e., P’s performance measures and its true contribution are perfectly
aligned, both M and P achieve the maximum profits.
Substitute (2) and (4) to (1), we have
Π∗R = sPR +
1
32
g2P3
‖−→gP‖2
(||−→fR||||−→fP || cos θR cos θP )2 (3.7)
According to (7), R’s profit increases in
g2P3
‖−→gP‖2 , which is the weight of R’s perfor-
mance on P’s overall performance. It also increases in ||−→fR|| and ||−→fP ||, the length of
−→
fR and
−→
fP , and decreases in θR and θP .
3.3.2 Directed Sourcing Model
In the directed sourcing model, the events are as follows.
1) M signs contract with P and R separately at the compensation of wMP =
sP + bMPpP , and wPR = sR + bPRpR respectively.
2) P chooses actions (aP1 and aP2) and R chooses actions (aR1 and aR2), both sets
of actions cannot be observed by M.
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3) M pays P and R the compensation specified by the contracts.
Again, I assume every party is risk-neutral. To solve the problem, I first find the
optimal actions for R (aR1 and aR2) for any given bonus rate (bPR), and the optimal
actions for P (aP1 and aP2) for any given bonus rate (bMP ); then I find the optimal
bMP and bMR jointly for M given P’s and R’s optimal actions.
I first look at the problem of R. Since R is simply the agent in the M-R contractual
relationship, we have a
′
R1 = bMRgR1 and a
′
R2 = bMRgR2, and the R’s expected payoff
and output at optimal solution are
Π
′
R = sMR +
1
2
b2MR(g
2
R1 + g
2
R2). (3.8)
y
′
R = bMR(fR1gR1 + fR2gR2) + εR (3.9)
For P, although it is also simply the agent in the M-P contractual relationship,
it’s performance depends on the contribution of R. P chooses the actions aP1 and aP2
to maximize the expected payoff E(wMP ) − c(aP1, aP2) given bMP and yR. Solving
P’s problem, we have
a
′
P1 = bMPgP1
a
′
P2 = bMPgP2
And P’s expected payoff and expected contribution at optimal solution are
Π
′
P = sMP +
1
2
b2MP (g
2
P1 + g
2
P2) + bMPgP3yR (3.10)
y
′
P = bMP (fP1gP1 + fP2gP2) + fP3y
′
R (3.11)
For M, it is the principal in both M-P and M-R contractual relationships. Knowing
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the optimal actions of P and R given any bonus rate bMP and bMR, M can choose
bMP and bMR to maximize it’s own payoff E(yP − wMP − wMR).
max
bMR,bMP
ΠM = E(yP − wMP − wMR)
= bMP (fP1gP1 + fP2gP2) + bMRfP3 (fR1gR1 + fR2gR2)
−b2MP
(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)− bMP bMRgP3 (fR1gR1 + fR2gR2)
−b2MR
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)− sMP − sMR
To solve M’s problem, assuming the Hessian matrix is negative definite:
4 (g2R1 + g
2
R2) (g
2
P1 + g
2
P2)− g2P3 (fR1gR1 + fR2gR2)2 > 0, we have
b
′
MP =
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2 − fP3gP3α2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)− g2P3α2
(3.12)
b
′
MR =
−→
fR · −→gR
2 ‖gR‖2
(fP3 − gP3fP1gP1 + fP2gP2 − fP3gP3α
2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)− g2P3α2
) (3.13)
And
b
′
MR = (fP3 − b
′
MPgP3)
(fR1gR1 + fR2gR2)
2(g2R1 + g
2
R2)
(3.14)
Unlike in the traditional tiered sourcing model, b
′
MR decreases as b
′
MP increases.
In this case, P does not transfer the incentives to R, but instead competes with R.
Therefore, the directed sourcing structure creates a “competition effect” between P
and R.
Proposition 1 : In the directed sourcing model,
∂b
′
MR
∂b
′
MP
< 0, while in the traditional
tiered sourcing model,
∂b∗PR
∂b∗MP
> 0.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the bonus rates for P and R are positively related
under the traditional tiered sourcing structure, but are negatively related under the
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directed sourcing structure. This finding implies that rewards and risks will be trans-
ferred to the lower-tier supplier through the top-tier supplier under the traditional
sourcing structure, while the two suppliers, although at different tiers, are competing
for rewards under the directed sourcing structure.
For P, we compare the two decision variables (a∗P1, a
∗
P2) with (a
′
P1, a
′
P2) under the
two different structures. Since the only difference between (a∗P1, a
∗
P2) and (a
′
P1, a
′
P2)
is the bonus coefficients, b∗MP and b
′
MP , we can compare b
∗
MP with b
′
MP .
b
′
MP − b∗MP =
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2 − fP3gP3α2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)− g2P3α2
− fP1gP1 + fP2gP2 + α
2gP3fP3
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2 + α
2g2P3)
=
( −→
fP ·−→gP
2‖−→gP‖23gP3 − 2fP3
)
gP3α
2
2 ‖−→gP‖2 − 3g2P3α2
In this case, if gP3 = 0 (i.e., P’s performance does not depend on R’s Output) or
α2 = 0 (i.e, cos θR = 0, R’s performance is orthogonal to R’s output), the two bonus
coefficients are the same. If gP3 6= 0 and α2 6= 0 , we have
b
′
MP − b∗MP =
3
4
−→
fP ·−→gP
‖−→gP‖2 −
fP3
gP3
‖−→gP‖2
g2P3α
2 − 32
Therefore, we have
Proposition 2:

b
′
MP − b∗MP = 0, if gP3 = 0 orα2 = 0
b
′
MP − b∗MP > 0, if 34
−→
fP ·−→gP
‖−→gP‖2 −
fP3
gP3
> 0 and
‖−→gP‖2
g2P3α
2 − 32 > 0, or
if 3
4
−→
fP ·−→gP
‖−→gP‖2 −
fP3
gP3
< 0 and
‖−→gP‖2
g2P3α
2 − 32 < 0;
b
′
MP − b∗MP < 0, if otherwise.
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Proposition 2 demonstrates that P’s bonus rate could be higher under the directed
sourcing structure than under the traditional sourcing structure, which implies that
P is not always worse off in the directed sourcing practice, so some resistance from
top-tier supplier during the implementation of directed sourcing practices can be
unnecessary. 2
Similarly, for R, we can simply compare the bonus coefficients for R, b∗PR and b
′
MR,
b
′
MR − b∗PR =
−→
fR·−→gR
2 ‖−→gR‖2
fP3 − gP3
2
−→
fP ·−→gP − (2fP3gP3α2)−
−→
fP ·−→gP
2‖−→gP‖2 (3g
2
P3α
2)(
2 ‖−→gP‖2 − 3g2P3α2
)


In this case, if
−→
fR·−→gR = 0, b′MR = b∗PR = 0. R makes no actions and has zero
bonus under either structure. If
−→
fR·−→gR 6= 0 and gP3 = 0, i.e., P’s performance does
not depend on R’s Output, b
′
MR > b
∗
PR always hold. R has higher level of actions and
profit under the directed sourcing structure than tiered sourcing structure.
Proposition 3: b
′
MR > b
∗
PR and Π
′
R > Π
∗
Rif
−→
fR·−→gR 6= 0 and gP3 = 0.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that R always has higher bonus rate and profit under
the directed sourcing structure than the tiered sourcing structure if R’s performance
measures is not completely misaligned and P’s performance measures do not take R’s
contribution into consideration.
If
−→
fR·−→gR 6= 0 and gP3 6= 0,
b
′
MR − b∗PR =
−→
fR·−→gR
2 ‖−→gR‖2
fP3
1− 2
−→
fP ·−→gP
fP3gP3α2
− 2− 3
−→
fP ·−→gP
2‖−→gP‖2
gP3
fP3(
2
‖−→gP‖2
g2P3α
2 − 3
)
gP3
fP3

For M, its payoff under optimal solution is
2Note that gP3 = 0 orα
2 = 0 is a sufficient but not necessary condition for b
′
MP − b∗MP = 0.
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Π
′
M =
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2 − fP3gP3α2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)− g2P3α2
(fP1gP1 + fP2gP2)
+
−→
fR · −→gR
2 ‖gR‖2
(fP3 − gP3fP1gP1 + fP2gP2 − fP3gP3α
2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)− g2P3α2
)fP3 (fR1gR1 + fR2gR2)
−
(
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2 − fP3gP3α2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)− g2P3α2
)2 (
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)
−
−→
fP ·−→gP − 2fP3gP3α2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)− g2P3α2
−→
fR · −→gR
2 ‖gR‖2
(fP3 − gP3
−→
fP ·−→gP − 2fP3gP3α2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)− g2P3α2
)gP3
−→
fR · −→gR
−
( −→
fR · −→gR
2 ‖gR‖2
(fP3 − gP3fP1gP1 + fP2gP2 − fP3gP3α
2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)− g2P3α2
)2 (
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)− sMP − sMR
Since the expression for M’s profit is difficult to interpret, I analyze two special
cases in section 4 and conduct numerical analysis in section 5 to gain further insights.
3.4 Special Cases
3.4.1 Case 1: The No Misalignment Condition
In this case, the performances of R and P can be perfectly measured so that
gi = fi, where i = R1, R2, P1, P2, and P3. In this case, there is no misalignment nor
goal incongruence within any contract.
For the tiered sourcing structure,
b∗MP =
1
2
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2 + α
2gP3fP3
g2P1 + g
2
P2 + α
2g2P3
=
1
2
b∗PR =
bMPgP3
2
−→
fR·−→gR
‖−→gR‖2
=
1
4
gP3
In this case b∗MP is a constant and b
∗
PR only depends on and increases in gP3.
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The profits for the three organizations under the tiered sourcing structure are:
Π∗R = s
∗
PR +
1
32
g2P3
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)
Π∗P = s
∗
MP − s∗PR +
1
8
[(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)
+
1
2
g2P3
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)]
Π∗M =
1
4
(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)
+
1
8
g2P3
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)− s∗MP
In this case, besides the salaries, M’s profit is twice that of P’s, and P’s profit is
more than R’s.
For the directed sourcing structure, we also assume the Hessian matrix is negative
definite:
4 (g2P1 + g
2
P2)− g2P3 (g2R1 + g2R2) > 0. In this case, we have:
b
′
MP =
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2 − 12fP3gP3α2 − 12fP3gP3α2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2 − 12g2P3α2)
=
1
2
− g
2
P3α
2
4(g2P1 + g
2
P2 − 12g2P3α2)
=
1
2
− g
2
P3 ‖gR‖2
8(g2P1 + g
2
P2 − 14g2P3 ‖gR‖2)
If gP3 = 0, b
′
MP = b
∗
MP =
1
2
, a constant, b∗PR = b
′
MR = 0. No difference in the
bonus rates. And the profits of the three organizations will be the same under the
two structure.
Proposition 4: If gi = fi, where i = R1, R2, P1, P2, and P3 and gP3 = 0, we
have Π∗R = Π
′
R, Π
∗
P = Π
′
P , and Π
∗
M = Π
′
M .
Proposition 4 demonstrates that under the no misalignment condition, if P’s per-
formance does not depend on R’s contribution, each party generates the same profit
under the two sourcing structures, i.e., the two structures are indifferent regarding
the optimal contract terms and payoffs of each party.
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If gP3 6= 0,
b
′
MP =
1
2
+
g2P3‖gR‖2
g2P1+g
2
P2
2(
g2P3‖gR‖2
g2P1+g
2
P2
− 4)
b
′
MR =
1
2
gP3(1− b′MP )
=
1
4
gP3 − 1
4
gP3
g2P3‖gR‖2
g2P1+g
2
P2
(
g2P3‖gR‖2
g2P1+g
2
P2
− 4)
Let β =
g2P3‖gR‖2
g2P1+g
2
P2
. Based on the assumption that the Hessian matrix is negative
definite, we have 0 < β < 4. In this case, b
′
MP < b
∗
MP = 1/2, and b
′
MR > b
∗
PR =
1
4
gP3.
P’s bonus coefficient is lower while R’s bonus coefficient is higher in the directed
sourcing structure. In general, β reflects the ratio of the weights of R’s outputs on
P’s performance/output over the weights of P’s own actions , i.e., weight of actions
not controlled by P (but by R) vs. weight of actions controlled by P . Therefore, we
defineβ as “the supplier dependency”, which can be considered as the dependency
coefficient of P on R. In particular, β is larger when P’s performance is more dependent
on R’s performance, i.e., P is more dependent. Therefore, we have
b
′
MP =
1
2
+
β
2(β − 4) =
2− β
4− β (3.15)
b
′
MR =
1
2
gP3(
1
2
− β
2(β − 4)) =
gP3
4− β (3.16)
According to (15) and (16), b
′
MR > 0 when 0 < β < 4 (Second-order condition), but
b
′
MP is negative when 2 < β < 4, which is problematic. Therefore, we added to two
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nonnegativity constraints to this problem. We now have:
max ΠM = bMP (1− bMP )
(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)
+ bMR(1− bMP )g2P3(g2R1 + g2R2)
− b2MR(g2R1 + g2R2)− sMP − sMR
s.t.
b
′
MR ≥ 0
bMP ≥ 0
Solving the above problem using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the modified
Lagrangean approach (Osborne, 2007), we have
b
′
MR =
gP3
4−β and b
′
MP =
2−β
4−β if 0 < β < 2
b
′
MR =
gP3
2
and b
′
MP = 0 if 2 ≤ β < 4
Under the directed sourcing structure, the profit for R is
Π
′
R =

s
′
PR +
1
32
(g2R1 + g
2
R2) g
2
P3 +
1
8
(g2R1 + g
2
R2) g
2
P3
β
2(β−4)(
β
2(β−4) − 1), if 0 < β < 2
s
′
PR +
1
8
(g2R1 + g
2
R2) g
2
P3, if 2 ≤ β < 4
Therefore, if 0 < β < 2,
Π∗R − Π
′
R = s
∗
PR +
1
32
g2P3
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)− s′PR − 132g2P3 (g2R1 + g2R2)
−1
8
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)
g2P3
β
2(β − 4)(
β
2(β − 4) − 1)
= s∗PR − s
′
PR +
1
32
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)
g2P3
β(β − 8)
(β − 4)2
< 0
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If 2 ≤ β < 4,
Π∗R − Π
′
R = s
∗
PR +
1
32
g2P3
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)− s′PR − 18g2P3 (g2R1 + g2R2)
< 0
In this case, Π∗R < Π
′
R for 0 < β < 4, i.e., R is always better off under the directed
sourcing structure.
Proposition 5 : If gi = fi, where i = R1, R2, P1, P2, and P3, gP3 > 0, and
0 ≤ β < 4, we have Π∗R < Π′R.
Proposition 5 implies that under the no misalignment condition, R is always better
off in directed sourcing.
The profit for P is
Π
′
P = sMP +
1
2
b2MP (g
2
P1 + g
2
P2) + bMP bMRgP3(g
2
R1 + g
2
R2)
=

sMP +
1
2
4−β2
(β−4)2 (g
2
P1 + g
2
P2) , if 0 < β < 2
sMP , if 2 ≤ β < 4
Therefore, if 0 < β < 2,
Π∗P − Π
′
P = s
∗
MP − s∗PR +
1
8
[(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)
+
1
2
g2P3
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)]
−s′MP −
1
2
4− β2
(β − 4)2
(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)
= s∗MP − s∗PR − s
′
MP +
1
16
(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
) β2(2 + β)
(β − 4)2
Assuming s∗MP − s∗PR − s′MP = 0 since the salaries are standard, Π∗P − Π′P ≥ 0
because β > 0. On the other hand, if 2 ≤ β < 4,
Π∗P − Π
′
P = s
∗
MP − s∗PR +
1
8
[(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)
+
1
2
g2P3
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)]− s′MP
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Again, assuming s∗MP − s∗PR − s′MP = 0, we have Π∗P − Π′P ≥ 0.
Proposition 6: If gi = fi, where i = R1, R2, P1, P2, and P3, gP3 > 0, and
0 ≤ β < 4, we have Π∗P < Π′P .
Proposition 6 demonstrates that if both P and R’s contribution can be perfectly
measured by the objective performance, P is always worse off in directed sourcing.
This proposition is consistent with the empirical evidence that top-tier suppliers typ-
ically resist directed sourcing.
The profit for M is
Π
′
M = bMP (1− bMP )
(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)
+ bMR(1− bMP )gP3(g2R1 + g2R2)
−b2MR(g2R1 + g2R2)− sMP − sMR
=

(g2P1 + g
2
P2)
1
4−β − sMP − sMR, if 0 < β < 2
1
4
g2P3 (g
2
R1 + g
2
R2)− sMP − sMR, if 2 ≤ β < 4
Therefore, if 0 < β < 2,
Π∗M − Π
′
M =
1
4
(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)
+
1
8
g2P3
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)− s∗MP
− (g2P1 + g2P2) 14− β + s′MP + s′MR
= s
′
MP + s
′
MR − s∗MP +
1
8
(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
) β(2− β)
4− β
Assuming s
′
MP + s
′
MR − s∗MP = 0, Π∗M − Π′M > 0 because 2−β4−β ¿0. On the other
hand, if 2 ≤ β < 4,
Π∗M − Π
′
M =
1
4
(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)
+
1
8
g2P3
(
g2R1 + g
2
R2
)− s∗MP − 14g2P3 (g2R1 + g2R2)+ s′MP + s′MR
=
1
8
(
g2P1 + g
2
P2
)
(2− β)
Again, assuming s
′
MP + s
′
MR − s∗MP = 0, we have Π∗M − Π′M ≤ 0.
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Table 3.1: Results in the Special Case of Perfect Alignment Between Any Two Levels
Supplier Dependency Low High
(β value) (0 < β < 2) (2 ≤ β < 4)
OEM (M) - +
Top-tier Supplier (P) - -
Second-tier Supplier (R) + +
+: The focal party is better off under the directed sourcing structure than the tradi-
tional tiered sourcing structure.
-: The focal party is worse off under the directed sourcing structure than the tradi-
tional tiered sourcing structure.
Proposition 7: If gi = fi, where i = R1, R2, P1, P2, and P3, and gP3 > 0,
a. if 2 < β < 4, Π∗M < Π
′
M ;
b. if 2 ≤ β < 4, Π∗M ≥ Π′M ;
Proposition 7 demonstrates that in the no misalignment condition, M is better off
in directed sourcing when the supplier dependency is high (2 ≤ β < 4 ), and is worse
off when the supplier dependency is low (0 < β < 2 ).
The results of Propositions 5-7 are summarize in table 3.1. In conclusion, even
when there is no goal incongruence within any contract under the no misalignment
condition, the directed sourcing strategy can still benefit the OEM when the supplier
dependency is high (2 < β < 4). In addition, R always benefits from directed
sourcing, but P is always worse off under the directed sourcing structure.
3.4.2 Case 2: The Complete Misalignment Condition
In the second special case, I examine the other extreme of goal incongruence in
which the performance is completely independent to the outputs at any level so that
the incentives are completely misaligned. In other words,
−→
fR is orthogonal to
−→gR, and
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−→
fP is orthogonal to
−→gP under both structures. I also compare the profits of each party
under both structures.
For the tiered sourcing structure,
b∗PR = 0
b∗MP =
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)
and
a∗R1 = a
∗
R2 = 0
a∗P1 = gP1
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)
a∗P2 = gP2
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)
Due to the misalignment, M and P will set the bonus rate to zero at the optimal
solution, and P and R will choose to have zero level of actions to improve their
performance but only engage in minimal effort as required to receive the salary. In
this case, the profit of each party is:
Π∗R = sPR
Π∗P = sMP − sPR +
1
8
(fP1gP1 + fP2gP2)
2
(g2P1 + g
2
P2)
Π∗M =
(fP1gP1 + fP2gP2)
2
4 (g2P1 + g
2
P2)
− sMP
For directed sourcing structure,
b
′
MR = 0
b
′
MP =
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)
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Since the bonus rates are the same as in the tiered sourcing structure, the action
levels and the profits will be the same as well. Therefore, we have
a
′
R1 = a
′
R2 = 0
a
′
P1 = gP1
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)
a
′
P = gP2
fP1gP1 + fP2gP2
2(g2P1 + g
2
P2)
and
Π
′
R = sPR
Π
′
P = sMP − sPR +
1
8
(fP1gP1 + fP2gP2)
2
(g2P1 + g
2
P2)
Π
′
M =
(fP1gP1 + fP2gP2)
2
4 (g2P1 + g
2
P2)
− sMP
The two structures are indifferent under this extreme condition. The same con-
clusion can be derived as long as
−→
fR is orthogonal to
−→gR. In other words, regardless
of
−→
fP and
−→gP , if −→fR is orthogonal to −→gR, the two structures yield the same profits for
each party, i.e., the two structures are indifferent.
Proposition 8 : if
−→
fR is orthogonal to
−→gR (cos θR = 0), we have Π∗R = Π′R, Π∗P =
Π
′
P , and Π
∗
M = Π
′
M .
In other words, when R’s performance measures are completely orthogonal to its
contribution, regardless of of P’s performance measure, the directed sourcing and
tiered sourcing structures yield the same profit for each party.
3.5 Numerical Analysis
To gain further insights from the models, I conduct numerical analysis in this sec-
tion. First, I examine the impact of the misalignment level for second-tier supplier on
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each party’s profit under several conditions. Figure 3.1 shows the OEM’s profits as
a function of θR under the traditional sourcing and the directed sourcing structures,
where θR is the misalignment between R’s contribution and its performance measures
and ranges from 0 to 90 degrees. The three figures in the first row show OEM’s prof-
its under the conditions that the misalignment level for P (the top-tier supplier) is
low, while P’s performance is highly independent (upper left), moderately dependent
(upper middle), and highly dependent (upper right), respectively. The three figures
in the second row show OEM’s profits under the conditions that the misalignment
level for P is high, while P’s performance is highly independent (lower left), moder-
ately dependent (lower middle), and highly dependent (lower right), respectively. In
general, the results show that, if the misalignment level for P is low, the OEM gen-
erates a lower profit under the directed sourcing structure than traditional sourcing,
but the difference generally decreases as R’s misalignment level increases. On the
other hand, if the misalignment level for P is high, the OEM generates a higher profit
under the directed sourcing structure than the traditional sourcing structure, and the
difference decreases as R’s misalignment level increases. In any situation, when R’s
misalignment level is at the highest (θR = 90), the two structures generate the same
profit levels for M, which is consistent with the finding in the special case.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show P’ and R’s profits as a function of θR under the traditional
sourcing and the directed sourcing structures respectively. Both sets of figures follow
the same order of conditions as in Figure 3.1. In general, the results show that the
top-tier supplier generates a lower profit, while the second-tier supplier generates
a higher profit under the directed sourcing structure than the traditional sourcing
structure. In addition, the differences decrease as R’s misalignment level increases.
Therefore, the directed sourcing structure generally benefits both the OEM and the
second-tier supplier but harm the top-tier supplier’s profit. However, the effect of the
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Figure 3.1: M’s Profits as a Function of θR under Traditional Sourcing and Directed
Sourcing Structures
directed sourcing structure diminishes as the misalignment level for the second-tier
supplier increases. In line with the finding in section 4.2, the two structures generate
the same profits to all three supply chain players when R’s performance measures
completely misaligned with R’s contribution. 3
Second, I examine the impact of the misalignment level for top-tier supplier on
each party’s profit under several conditions. Figure 3.4 shows the OEM’s profits as
a function of θP under traditional sourcing and directed sourcing structures, where
θP is the misalignment between P’s contribution and its performance measures and
ranges from 0 to 90 degrees. The three figures in the first row show the OEM’s profits
under the conditions that the misalignment level for R (the second-tier supplier) is
low, while P’s performance is highly independent (upper left), moderately dependent
(upper middle), and highly dependent (upper right), respectively. The three figures in
the second row show the OEM’s profits under the conditions that the misalignment
level for R is high, while P’s performance is highly independent (lower left), mod-
3To generate these figures, I set fR = [ 1 0.01 ] and the norm of ‖gR‖ to 1, while change θR,
the angle of fR and gR, from 0 to 90 degrees.
110
0 20 40 60 80 100
θR (deg)
2.5
2.501
2.502
2.503
2.504
2.505
2.506
2.507
Π
×10-3 θR vs ΠP and ΠPD
fR=[1  0.01]
gP=[0.1  0.1  0.01]
fP=[0.1  0.1  0.01]
ΠP
ΠPD
0 20 40 60 80 100
θR (deg)
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
3
3.1
3.2
Π
×10-3 θR vs ΠP and ΠPD
fR=[1  0.01]
gP=[0.1  0.1  0.1]
fP=[0.1  0.1  0.1]
ΠP
ΠPD
0 20 40 60 80 100
θR (deg)
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Π
×10-3 θR vs ΠP and ΠPD
fR=[1  0.01]
gP=[0.1  0.1  0.2]
fP=[0.1  0.1  0.2]
ΠP
ΠPD
0 20 40 60 80 100
θR (deg)
4.98
5
5.02
5.04
5.06
5.08
5.1
5.12
Π
×10-5 θR vs ΠP and ΠPD
fR=[1  0.01]
gP=[0.19  0.01  0.01]
fP=[0.01  0.19  0.01]
ΠP
ΠPD
0 20 40 60 80 100
θR (deg)
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Π
×10-4 θR vs ΠP and ΠPD
fR=[1  0.01]
gP=[0.19  0.01  0.1]
fP=[0.01  0.19  0.1]
ΠP
ΠPD
0 20 40 60 80 100
θR (deg)
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
Π
×10-3 θR vs ΠP and ΠPD
fR=[1  0.01]
gP=[0.19  0.01  0.2]
fP=[0.01  0.19  0.2]
ΠP
ΠPD
Figure 3.2: P’s Profits as a Function of θR under Traditional Sourcing and Directed
Sourcing Structures
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Figure 3.3: R’s Profits as a Function of θR under Traditional Sourcing and Directed
Sourcing Structures
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Figure 3.4: M’s Profits as a Function of θP under Traditional Sourcing and Directed
Sourcing Structures
erately dependent (lower middle), and highly dependent (lower right), respectively.
In general, the results show that, if P’s performance is highly independent to R’s
contribution (upper left and lower left in Figure 3.4), the OEM generates the same
profits under the directed sourcing structure as under traditional sourcing. If P’s
performance is moderately dependent to R’s contribution (upper middle and lower
middle in Figure 3.4), the OEM generates the lower profits under directed sourcing
structure than under traditional sourcing when P’s misalignment level is low; but as
P’s misalignment level increase, the difference decreases and after a certain point,
the directed sourcing structure outperforms the traditional sourcing structure. If P’s
performance is highly dependent to R’s contribution (upper right and lower right in
Figure 3.4), the OEM generates lower profits under the directed sourcing structure as
under the traditional sourcing. Therefore, whether the directed sourcing outperform
the the traditional sourcing structure depends on how accurately the OEM can assess
top-tier supplier’s contributions using the objective performance measures.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show P’s and R’s profits as a function of θP under traditional
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Figure 3.5: P’s Profits as a Function of θP under Traditional Sourcing and Directed
Sourcing Structures
sourcing and directed sourcing structures, respectively. Both sets of figures follow the
same order of conditions as in Figure 3.4. In general, the results show that the top-
tier supplier generates a lower profit, while the second-tier supplier generates a higher
profit under the directed sourcing structure than the traditional sourcing structure.
In addition, the differences increases as P’s misalignment level increases. Therefore,
directed sourcing structure generally benefits both the second-tier supplier but harms
the top-tier supplier’s profit, and the benefit to the second-tier supplier increases as
P’s misalignment level increases. 4
Finally, I examine how the dependence of top-tier supplier’s performance on
second-tier supplier’s contributions influence each party’s profit under several con-
ditions. Figure 3.7 shows the OEM’s profits as a function of β under traditional
sourcing and directed sourcing structures, where β =
g2P3‖gR‖2
g2P1+g
2
P2
is the dependence level
of P’s performance on R’s contribution, a higher value for β indicates P is more de-
4To generate these figures, I set fP = [ 1 0.01 1 ] , while change gP1 and gP2, so that θP , the
angle of fP and gP , changes from 0 to up to 90 degrees.
113
0 20 40 60 80 100
θP (deg)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Π
×10-4 θP vs ΠR and ΠRD
fR=[0.5  0.5]
gR=[0.5  0.5]
fP=[1  0.01  0.1]
gP3=0.1
ΠR
ΠRD
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
θP (deg)
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Π
θP vs ΠR and ΠRD
fR=[0.5  0.5]
gR=[0.5  0.5]
fP=[1  0.01  1]
gP3=1
ΠR
ΠRD
0 2 4 6 8
θP (deg)
0
0.5
1
1.5
Π
θP vs ΠR and ΠRD
fR=[0.5  0.5]
gR=[0.5  0.5]
fP=[1  0.01  10]
gP3=10
ΠR
ΠRD
0 20 40 60 80 100
θP (deg)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Π
×10-4 θP vs ΠR and ΠRD
fR=[0.5  0.5]
gR=[0.01  1]
fP=[1  0.01  0.1]
gP3=0.1
ΠR
ΠRD
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
θP (deg)
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Π
θP vs ΠR and ΠRD
fR=[0.5  0.5]
gR=[0.01  1]
fP=[1  0.01  1]
gP3=1
ΠR
ΠRD
0 2 4 6 8
θP (deg)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Π
θP vs ΠR and ΠRD
fR=[0.5  0.5]
gR=[0.01  1]
fP=[1  0.01  10]
gP3=10
ΠR
ΠRD
Figure 3.6: R’s Profits as a Function of θP under Traditional Sourcing and Directed
Sourcing Structures
pendent on R. The two figures in the first row show the OEM’s profits under the
conditions that the misalignment level for P (the top-tier supplier) is low, while the
misalignment level for R (the second-tier supplier) is low (upper left) and high (upper
right), respectively. The two figures in the second row show the OEM’s profits under
the conditions that the misalignment level for P (the top-tier supplier) is high, while
the misalignment level for R (the second-tier supplier) is low (lower left) and high
(lower right), respectively. In general, the results show that, if the misalignment lev-
els for both P and R are low, the OEM generates a higher profit under the directed
sourcing structure than traditional sourcing, but the difference generally increases
as P’s independence level increases. On the other hand, if one of the misalignment
levels for either P or R is low and the other is high, the OEM generates a similar and
slightly higher profit under the directed sourcing structure than under the traditional
sourcing structure.
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show P’ and R’s profits as a function of β under traditional
sourcing and directed sourcing structures, respectively. Both sets of figures follow
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Figure 3.7: M’s Profits as a Function of β under Traditional Sourcing and Directed
Sourcing Structures
the same order of conditions as in Figure 3.7. In general, the results show that the
top-tier supplier generates same level of profit, except that the profit level is higher
in traditional sourcing when the misalignment levels for both P and R are low, and
the difference decreases as the independence level increases. For R, the results are
similar to M: if the misalignment levels for both P and R are low or high, R gener-
ates higher profit under the directed sourcing structure than the traditional sourcing
structure, and the difference generally increases as P’s independence level increases;
and if one of the misalignment levels for both P and R is low and the other is high, the
OEM generates a similar and slightly higher profit under the directed sourcing struc-
ture than under the traditional sourcing structure. Therefore, the directed sourcing
structure generally benefits the second-tier supplier but harms the top-tier supplier’s
profit, and the benefit to the second-tier supplier increases as P’s independence level
increases 5 .
5To generate these figures, I set fP = [ 1 0.01 1 ] , while change gR3 from
1
5 to 5 so that β
changes from 125 to 25.
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Directed sourcing is an emerging practice adopted by several industry leaders and,
yet, research that examines the potential benefits and the underlying issues associ-
ated with this new supply chain structure is still in its infancy. By developing the
triadic multi-task model, this study quantifies the benefits and the challenges of direct
sourcing for each supply chain party. In particular, I started by analyzing each party’s
optimal actions under the two supply chain structures and compared their payoffs in
the general case. I also investigated two special cases with different levels of goal
incongruence: one with no goal incongruence given the performance measure and the
true contribution are perfectly aligned (the no misalignment condition, and the other
with maximum goal incongruence given that the performance measure and the true
contribution are orthogonal (the complete misalignment condition). Furthermore, I
conducted numerical analysis to further illustrate the findings.
The analysis results from the general case indicate that the bonus terms for the
top-tier and second-tier suppliers are positively associated under the traditional sourc-
ing structure. In other words, top-tier supplier will pass on the reward or risk from
the OEM to the second-tier supplier in traditional sourcing. This chain effect is com-
monly seen in practice: when manufacture gradually squeeze the top-tier supplier’s
profit by reducing the bonus rate, the top-tier supplier will also deliver this reduction
to the second-tier suppliers. In this case, the second-tier suppliers are facing the risk
of bankruptcy if they do not have much buffer to absorb the squeeze of their prof-
its. One the other hand, the bonus terms for the top-tier and second-tier suppliers
are negatively associated under the tiered sourcing structure. In other words, the
top-tier and second-tier suppliers are competing for the bonus as one increases while
the other decreases. The chain effect is avoided under the directed sourcing struc-
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ture in that the top-tier supplier cannot pass on financial pressure to the second-tier
supplier, but, instead, this structure creates tension between the two parties, which
could potentially benefit the OEM (Burt, 1992).
The analysis results from the special case under the no misalignment condition
indicate that the OEM is better off under the directed sourcing structure if the sup-
plier dependency is high. The results also indicate that the top-tier supplier is always
worse off under the directed sourcing structure, which echos empirical evidence that
top-tier suppliers normally resist the implementation of directed sourcing (Kim and
Hur, 2015), and the second-tier supplier always benefits from the directed sourcing
structure. These results also imply that directed sourcing does not always outperform
the traditional sourcing even from the OEM’s perspective. Therefore, OEMs should
be selective in adopting this strategy to a certain component based on how much
the value of the component is dependent on the second-tier supplier as well as how
accurate the contribution of each party is measured by the objective performance.
From the analysis result for the special case in which the performance measures for
the second-tier supplier is orthogonal to its actual contribution, i.e., the measures are
completely misaligned, each party gains the same profit under the two structures. In
other words, under the complete misalignment condition, directed sourcing does not
improve the situation.
The results from numerical analysis illustrate that directed sourcing structure
generally benefits the OEM and the second-tier supplier while it harms the top-tier
supplier, which is consistent with the results from the analytical model and with em-
pirical evidence (Choi and Linton, 2011; Kim and Hur, 2015). The results also show
that the difference between the two structures generally decreases as R’s misalign-
ment level increases and as P’s misalignment level decreases. In addition, there are
conditions under which the OEM is worse off in directed sourcing. These results are
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consistent with the analytical findings and indicate that the OEM should be selective
in implementing the directed sourcing strategy, and the resistance from the top-tier
supplier might be overcome under certain conditions. Finally, when the misalignment
levels are low within any dyad, the benefit of directed sourcing to the OEM is in-
creasing as the top-tier supplier’s dependence on the second-tier supplier increases.
This observation is also consistent with empirical evidence that the OEM should di-
rectly work with those second-tier suppliers who provide critical components (Choi
and Linton, 2011; Yan et al., 2015).
Beyond the current study, I propose several directions for future studies. First of
all, I assumed that the P’s actions are independent to R’s contribution. However, it
is more realistic to assume that as least one of the actions should be related to R’s
contribution. For example, if R delivers the raw material late, P will need to make
more of an effort and incur a higher cost in order to deliver to M on time. Second,
I assumed that all three parties are risk-neutral so that the expected pay-off can be
used as the objective function. It is more realistic to assume the three parties have
different risk attitudes. For example, it’s common that M, P, and R are large, medium
and small size firms, respectively. In this case, their risk attitudes are likely to be
neutral, somewhat risk-averse, and extremely risk-averse. Therefore, future research
can take risks into consideration and investigate how the two structures affect each
party’s profits. Finally, future research may also be conducted to collect more specific
information regarding the level of goal incongruence and each party’s performance,
and to empirically analyze and test some of the findings. Such empirical studies
should complement our analytical work and provide richer insights to the directed
sourcing strategy.
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